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The purpose of this thesis is the exploration of the relationship and interaction 
between Electronic Warfare (EW) and Information Operations (IO) core, supporting and 
related competencies. Understanding the definitions of information and its value, 
information superiority, and the decision making cycle provides the foundation for the 
thesis. Investigation of the historical transformation of EW from the U.S. Civil War to the 
First Gulf War, and also examining how the concept of IO has developed and evolved 
contributes to this study by helping to comprehend the modern day interaction between 
EW and each IO competency separately. This interaction is constructed upon the 
guidance and standards provided by the latest U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication Joint 
Publication 3-13 Information Operations. 
This study concludes that the relationship between EW and IO is increasingly 
interactive and consists of two aspects:  limiting and interfering, and reinforcing and 
supporting. Also, the relationship between EW and each IO competency is not consistent 
between the core and supporting competencies. In addition to these conclusions, this 
study expresses some considerations for EW and IO applications with respect to the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Information dominance has been at the heart of military operations throughout 
history. In the information age the importance of information dominance and information 
superiority must be carefully addressed. Advanced technologies that are only a few 
decades old are now dramatically changing the way information is collected, stored, 
analyzed, and disseminated. The speed, accuracy, and timeliness of information has 
generated substantial research on these issues and ultimately stimulated the creation of 
the concept of Information Operations (IO). IO has many advantages over conventional 
operational concepts. Some of these advantages include, but are not limited to: 
• IO can be applied throughout the full spectrum of peace, pre-conflict, 
conflict, post-conflict, and back to peace. 
• IO is not only a military application; it is an entire process of decision 
making at every level, concerned with how to protect decision-making 
processes and influence adversaries in a desired manner. 
• IO does not only impact military activities, but also has economic and 
politic aspects. 
• IO can be utilized to avoid wars using core and related competencies, such 
as Defense Support to Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. 
• With IO, collateral damage can be minimized while still imposing 
objectives upon the adversary. 
These advantages make IO increasingly relevant in the information age due to the 
variety of means IO uses to achieve the objective. It is important to keep in mind that IO 
is more about the objective than the means. 
A. RESEARCH FOCUS 
 Understanding what information really is and its environment is critical to 
understanding the importance of information superiority, especially for leaders and 
decision makers. One research focus of this thesis is on the explanation of all of these 
concepts 
2 
Another research area examines the historical perspectives of Electronic Warfare 
(EW) from the U.S. Civil War through the First Gulf War. This research will present a 
historical synopsis of improvements in EW technology and its applications, and how they 
have been used during the major battles of the last century. 
There are many studies available on Information Operations (IO) and its possible 
applications. However, there is no comprehensive study discussing how Electronic 
Warfare relates and interacts with each IO competency, whether core, supporting, or 
related. This thesis investigates the relationships between EW and twelve other 
competencies that are a part of, are related to, or support IO. 
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study will research the answers to the following questions: 
• What is Information Operations (IO)?  
• What are the core, supporting, and related competencies of IO? 
• Why is IO gaining in importance? 
• How did Electronic Warfare evolve in the last century? 
• What is information? 
• What is the information environment? 
• Why is information important for military operations? 
• What is information superiority? 
• Is there a difference between command and control warfare (C2W), 
Information Warfare (IW), and Information Operations? 
• What is the relationship and interaction between EW and the IO 
competencies? 
• How might the principles and theory behind IO be best applied to the 




C. KEY DEFINITIONS  
Understanding the following important terms helps to better discuss the issues 
within this thesis. 
Information: Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. Information also 
refers to the meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions 
used in their representation (Joint Publication 1-02, 256). 
Information Operations (IO): IO are described as the integrated employment of 
electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations 
(PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert 
with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp 
adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own (Joint 
Publication 3-13, I-1). 
Information Warfare (IW):   Information Operations that is conducted during 
time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over an adversary. 
Information Superiority: A state of balance in one’s favor in the information 
domain (Joint Vision 2020, 8) or the operational advantage derived from the ability to 
collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or 
denying an adversary’s ability to do the same (Joint Publication 1-02, 257). 
Information Environment:   The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and 
systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (Joint Publication 1-02, 
257). 
Electronic Warfare (EW):   In military operations, the term EW refers to any 
military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy or directed energy to control 
the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Electronic Warfare includes three 
major subdivisions: electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic 
warfare support (ES) (Joint Publication 3-51, I-1). 
Electromagnetic Environment: The resulting product of the power and time 
distribution, in various frequency ranges, of the radiated or conducted electromagnetic 
emission levels that may be encountered by a military force, system, or platform when 
performing its assigned mission in its intended operational environment. It is the sum of 
4 
electromagnetic interference; electromagnetic pulse; hazards of electromagnetic radiation 
to personnel, ordnance, and volatile materials; and natural phenomena effects of lightning 
and precipitation static (Joint Publication 1-02, 175). The electromagnetic environment is 
the environment in which electromagnetic energy resides.  
D. IMPORTANCE AND BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
Although this thesis is very comprehensive and electronic warfare-focused, many 
technical details and formulations are not included. The reason is that the study is 
intended to be easily understandable by non-engineers and other non-technical 
individuals with little or no EW or IO training, education, or background. This will 
benefit the study by broadening the targeted readers available. 
This thesis will serve to broaden decision makers’ understanding of the activities 
in the information age concerning information operations. It lays out the importance of 
information and the value it has, and also information superiority and its impact over both 
the adversary and friendly decision-making processes, which is the ultimate objective of 
information operations activities. A historical look at the evolution of electronic warfare 
and its impact on military activities will assist military leaders to appreciate the 
importance of this discipline. At the same time, this study will cover the birth and 
evolution of information operations ideologies. 
Other studies of EW, and more recently of IO, have been done. However, none of 
them depicts the individual relationships of EW with each IO competency. This thesis 
will endeavor to explore these relationships and interactions, providing a unique 
contribution to literature in the field of study. 
One other important aspect of this thesis is that it adapts information operations 
and electronic warfare to the particular environment of Turkey and discusses some 
considerations on the advancement Turkey has already made, and is yet to make, in these 
areas. This is an effort to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Turkey‘s efforts in 
IO and EW.  
The Interviews with two Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) faculty members on 
Information Operations and the Wild Weasel EW mission will help to describe and 
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increase comprehension of Information Operations concepts, and will serve to discuss the 
Wild Weasel mission from a first-hand perspective. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis consists of six chapters and three appendices. A flow for the thesis is 
presented in Figure 1 for easy visualization. 
Chapter I presents an introduction to the entire thesis. It also asks the major 
questions to be answered and comments on the importance and benefits of this thesis. 
Chapter II establishes an understanding of information and its value, the 
information environment, and information superiority. Also it investigates the importance 
of information for military operations. 
Chapter III introduces IO and EW concepts and definitions in depth. It defines 
each IO competency and each EW discipline, which helps with the exploration of the 
interaction between IO and EW. 
Chapter IV emphasizes the historical perspective of Electronic Warfare. It 
investigates some of the major conflicts, from the U.S. Civil War to the First Gulf War, 
from an EW perspective. In this chapter the birth and evolution of IO as a concept, along 
with the differences between command and control warfare (C2W), information warfare 
(IW), and IO are also addressed. This chapter lays out the vital role that EW plays in 
conflicts and its increasing importance for information systems and actions. 
Chapter V focuses on how each of the IO competencies interacts with EW and 
explores the mutual relationship between each of them. This chapter evaluates each IO 
competency from its relationship to electronic warfare, which might be either limiting or 
reinforcing, or both. 
Chapter VI emphasizes the considerations of IO and EW for the Turkish Republic 
and discusses some possible applications of IO and EW with respect to the specific 
environment of Turkey. This chapter also concludes the study and provides 
recommendations for further research.  
The appendices include interviews with two Naval Postgraduate School faculty 
members about IO concepts and the “Wild Weasels.” The Wild Weasel concept is 
6 
important because it shows how tactics drive the technology, and the significance of 






































II.  INFORMATION 
A. BACKGROUND  
It is no secret that possessing the right information at the right time, in the hands 
of the right people, provides a crucial advantage for individuals, organizations, and 
nations. There has been a continuous struggle to acquire valuable information about 
adversaries while protecting information about ourselves. At the same time information 
should not be perceived as only a strategic phenomenon, it is also important at 
operational and tactical levels for planning and execution purposes. The struggle to 
acquire valuable information can take the form of economical, political, or military 
efforts. With the advent of the technical revolution in collecting, storing, analyzing, and 
disseminating data, beginning in the 1970s, the conduct of warfare has significantly 
changed. The first widely noted impact of this information revolution that affected the 
way a war was fought was exhibited during Operation DESERT STORM, or the First 
Gulf War.  
1. How is Information Defined? 
As stated in Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, information is a 
strategic resource vital to national security, and military operations now frequently 
depend on information and information systems for many simultaneous and integrated 
activities. It is difficult to explain information operations or any information-related 
activity without properly understanding the definition of information. Information is 
described as the facts, data, or instructions residing in some kind of medium or form. It is 
also defined as the meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known 
conventions used when representing that data (Joint Publication 1-02, 256). Information 
is a term commonly used to refer to many points on the spectrum from raw data to 
knowledge, as seen in Figure 2. But in its most basic meaning, information is the result of 
putting individual observations, sensor returns or data items, into some meaningful 




Figure 2.   The Process of How Raw Data Becomes Knowledge. 
 
Data is the representation of facts, concepts, or instructions in a formalized 
manner. Data should be suitable for communication, interpretation, or processing by 
humans or by automatic means (Joint Publication 1-02, 140).Radar returns, human 
observations, and other sensor inputs can be considered as data. It should be remembered 
that information and knowledge do not necessarily mean the same thing. Available 
information suggests conclusions drawn from patterns and leads to knowledge. 
“Knowledge of the situation can be drawn from conclusions that can be drawn from 
information about, for example, the types and locations of battle space entities” (Alberts 
2001, 17). 
2. Understanding the Information Environment 
The information environment is an “aggregate of individuals, systems and 
organizations that are able to collect, process, disseminate or act on information” (Joint 
Publication 3-13, I-1).According to this definition, not only the systems and equipment 
that manipulate information, but also the decision makers, or individuals, should be 
considered as a part of the information environment. Humans and automated systems 
observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) upon information in the information 
environment according to the well known OODA loop decision cycle. Therefore, the 
information environment is the principal environment of the decision making process. 
Although the information environment is considered distinct, it still resides within each 
of the four domains: sea, land, space, and air (Joint Publication 3-13, I-1). To better 


















depicts the three dimensions of the information environment, which are the physical 
dimension, the information dimension, and the cognitive dimension. 
 
        
Figure 3.   Three Dimensions of the Information Environment 
 
The physical dimension is the first dimension where physical platforms and 
communications networks reside. Elements in this dimension are easy to measure, so 
combat power is conceptually measured here. The physical dimension can also be 
considered as ground truth or reality (Alberts 2001, 12). “Command and control systems, 
and supporting infrastructures that enable individuals and organizations across air, land, 
sea and space domains, reside in the physical domain” (Joint Publication 3-13, I-
1).Examples of the physical dimension might be people, places, and capabilities like 
geographical coordinates and communications infrastructure.  
The second dimension is the information dimension, where the information 
resides. The information is created, manipulated, and shared here (Alberts 2001, 12). 
More precisely, activities like collection, storage, display, and protection of information 
are all performed in this dimension. The information dimension is where modern military 
forces communicate and the commander’s intent is conveyed. It consists of “content and  
flow of information that must be protected” (Joint Publication 3-13, I-2). Examples 
include but are not limited to, context and content, usage of information capabilities, and 
networks of human-to-human contact.  
The third dimension is the cognitive dimension. This dimension is considered to 
be the most important among the three because it is the dimension in which wars are 
actually won or lost. The cognitive dimension is described as the minds of participants 
where perceptions, beliefs, biases, quality of education, leadership, and morale exist, and 








where decisions are made using these. Cultural and social factors, identity, and credibility 
of key decision makers are examples of the cognitive domain. As these features change 
from person to person, personal cognition of the world also changes. That is why it is 
difficult to measure the effectiveness of manipulation of the cognitive domain and to 
establish a set of standard rules for success in this area (Alberts 2001, 13).  
In recent years, advanced technology has made it easy to manipulate the data in 
the information and physical dimensions. As it is easier to store, manipulate, and 
disseminate the data, it is more vulnerable to exploitation. On the other hand, the 
cognitive dimension is still not readily vulnerable to exploitation because recent 
technology still can not change people’s beliefs and biases easily. Therefore, the side that 
can manipulate the cognitive domain is likely to succeed in obtaining information 
superiority. Figure 4 shows the three information environment dimensions and their 
characteristics. 
 
Figure 4.   Dimensions of the Information Environment (After Joint Publication 3-13, 
I-2) 
3. Information Superiority in Information Operations (IO) 
Information superiority is transitory in nature and must be created and 
sustained through the conduct of information operations. However, the 
creation of information superiority is not an end in itself. Information 
superiority provides a competitive advantage only when it is effectively 
translated into superior knowledge and decisions. One must be able to take 
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achieve “decision superiority”—better decisions arrived at and 
implemented faster than an opponent can react, or in a non-combat 
situation, at a tempo that allows the force to shape the situation or react to 
changes and accomplish its mission (Joint Vision 2020, 8). 
It is helpful to understand what information superiority means in order to better 
conduct information operations and to be able to make better decisions than an adversary. 
In Joint Publication 3-13, the principal goal of information operations is stated as 
“achieving and maintaining information superiority” (IX), which provides the 
commander an advantage only when it translates into superior decisions. Information 
superiority is a state of balance in one’s favor in the information domain (Joint Vision 
2020, 8). This can be accomplished by getting the right information to the right people at 
the right time in the right form, while denying an adversary the ability to do the same.  
Trying to gain information superiority is not a new concept. Commanders and 
leaders have always tried to do so, and those who have gained this advantage have had 
significant success against the enemy. Sun-Tzu was a profound thinker who was able to 
lay out some of the basic fundamentals of gaining information dominance over the 
enemy, now called Information Operations (IO).  
Normally, information can be considered independent from technology. But it 
should be remembered that acquiring, processing, and disseminating information has 
become very dependent on technology. For this reason, technology is a big contributor to 
information superiority if it can be used correctly (Fogleman and Widnall 1995, 2). 
B. WHY IS INFORMATION ESSENTIAL TO THE MILITARY? 
It would be wrong to consider information as a critical element only in the 
political and economical context.  Information has always been at the center of military 
operations throughout history and will continue to be so. Many centuries ago Sun-Tzu 
emphasized the role of information and knowledge in warfare saying, “Know your enemy 
and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never know peril. When you are 
ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If 
you are ignorant of both your enemy and yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in 
peril.”(Sun Tzu 2002, 51) This is a famous and widely known quote from Sun-Tzu 
underlining the importance of information in warfare. This saying describes the basic 
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fundamentals of Information Operations. Information Operations (IO) is about knowing 
ourselves and denying that information to the enemy, or trying to know the enemy better 
in order to exploit their vulnerabilities. Sun-Tzu stated this concept about twenty-five 
centuries ago.  
Individuals at all levels of military service must comprehend the vitality of 
information and act accordingly. It is also useful to understand the reasons information is 
essential for the military. Due to its complicated nature, there is always some uncertainty 
in a military environment about where the friendly and enemy forces are, what 
capabilities and intentions they have, and other things of this nature. In order to prevail 
against this uncertainty, leaders from the top to bottom levels need to gain information 
about the enemy and the battlespace. Only with timely and accurate information can a 
decision maker consistently come up with the correct action.   
Determining the correct action has been very difficult to accomplish until 
recently. Modern advances in technology, in a general sense compared to older 
technologies, now provide the commander with a great deal of information to understand, 
analyze and act upon according to what is happening on the battlefield. Despite this, there 
will always be a significant level of residual uncertainty that will persist (Alberts 2001, 
37). This is inevitable by nature. Even on the battlefield of the future it will probably be 
impossible to eliminate all uncertainty. The uncertainty might occur due to the flaws and 
imperfections of sensors, the differences in human perceptions, and many other potential 
reasons. Therefore, the side which makes the fewest errors manipulating the information 
will probably make better and healthier decisions and prevail.  
Advances in technology have increased the complexity of information collection, 
processing, and dissemination; there is a great concern about how this will change the 
way wars are fought and the role it will play in transforming the tactics on the ground and 
the unit structure. In the interview located in Appendix B, Mr. Fisher stated “it is 
important not to have technology drive military tactics. If we are complacent with 
technology, then someone smarter than us might go ahead and develop new tactics and 
weapons that surprise us and catch us off-guard”. In this sense, it is essential for each and 
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every individual in the military to understand the role of technology and information in 
depth so that he or she can carry out missions effectively.  
If countries can not be successful in the adopting a comprehensive and disciplined 
process when confronted with these technologies, the positive potential that they possess 
can not be realized. In such case, there is high likelihood that negative impacts might 
reach to unacceptable limits. The solution to this problem is co-evolution of concepts, 
doctrines, organizational structure, training, and new technology. To perform this task in 
the battlespace effectively requires understanding the value and importance of 
information. Information has a great impact on transforming military equipment and 
operations by providing commanders with a large quantity and quality of information. 
Thus the commander has the advantage over the adversary of observing and analyzing 
the battlespace and communicating a decision to the forces with quality information 
(Fogleman and Widnall 1995, 2). 
Information is a strategic resource that is critical for military operations and the 
security of nations. With the uncertainty and complexity of the battlespace, military 
operations are incredibly dependent on information and information systems to integrate, 
coordinate, and synchronize activities. This introduces military decision makers to 
another challenge: the same tools the military uses, such as the Public Affairs, 
Psychological Operations, the Internet, and modern media, can be used by adversaries 
and might cause a significant adverse impact on the military environment, because they 
are available to almost everyone around the globe (Joint Publication 3-13, I-4). They are 
cheap to obtain, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), and easy to establish and sustain. 
They do not require a high level of expertise. This perspective contributes to the 
importance of information for military operations.  
Another contribution that information makes is during the planning process. To 
plan operations professionally, military decision makers should study and understand the 
importance of information for operations because the desired effect of information 
operations is not always to fight and destroy the enemy. Each military operation 
necessitates different goals in terms of IO. In humanitarian assistance, for example, the  
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end result should be winning the “hearts and minds” of the targeted audience (TA). Only 
a commander who can understand the impacts and desired end effects of information in 
depth can make appropriate decisions.  
In addition, understanding the importance of information in depth will enable the 
commander to visualize the information operations capabilities of the adversary and take 
the necessary precautions to prevent friendly information from compromise by the 
enemy. The continuously changing nature of the combat zone actually adds more 
complexity to the processing of information and thus makes understanding information 
even more difficult (Joint Publication 3-13, I-4). 
C. MEASURING THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION  
The quality of information is important in any kind of operation. Nevertheless it is 
very difficult to measure and in most cases almost impossible. The quality criteria for 
information are shown in Figure 5. However different goals for the use of information 
require different application of these criteria as well as a different weighing of each 
criterion (Joint Publication 3-13, I-3). For every particular case, some of these criteria 
might be omitted or applied in varying weight. In any case, they play important roles in 
being able to get the right information, at the right time, in the hands of those who need 
it. 
As we don’t have a means to measure the quality of information before it is 
obtained, the quality often is subjective. It changes according to the cognitive dimension 
of the particular individual, his or her biases, education, training, morale, and experience. 
From this perspective Information Operations is very different from conventional warfare 
targeting and kinetic weapons where measuring the effectiveness of the tools is easier 
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Figure 5.   Quality Criteria of Information (After Joint Publication 3-13, I-3)  
 
D. WHAT IS THE OODA LOOP? 
As mentioned above, all Information Operations efforts concentrate on decision-
making processes. The ultimate IO objective is to influence the adversary decision 
making cycle and the same time protect the friendly. One of the methodologies used to 
understand decision-making processes is Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA). OODA is 
a theory that was developed by Col. John Boyd, a former U.S. Air Force officer. This 
process is critical not only for military commanders but also political leaders, or any 




Figure 6.   The Sequential Phases of the OODA Loop 
 
In the OODA process, there are four phases: observe, orient, decide, and act. The 
OODA loop shown in Figure 6 is a process that ultimately creates an action for a specific 
situation. The continuity and completion of the loop must be sustained at all times in 
order to make healthy and correct decisions. 
The OODA loop is important when making distinctions between different 
decisions. Many quick and reflexive decisions might not require all phases of the loop as 
they might be short-circuited. An example is a soldier who is quickly deciding whether 
he will shoot the enemy or not when they confront each other suddenly. In this example it 
is not wrong to say that the soldier is probably only using “observe” and “act” phases of 
the OODA loop since he or she does not have ample time to orient and decide. In other 
words observe and orient merge and become one phase, and decide and act likewise 
merge. Nevertheless, more complex decisions use each step of the decision cycle (Alberts 
2001, 23). As the faces of the battles are changing due to technological developments, the 
decision makers’ need to the OODA loop increase. 
Observation is the initial step in the OODA loop. A commander gathers 
information from all available sources, such as surveillance, reconnaissance, and target 
acquisition. The information collected in the observation step of the loop is converted 













this phase are very important because actions carried out in the following phases will all 
depend on the data collected during the observation phase. 
In the orientation phase the commander tries to understand the actual situation and 
environment of both sides (Joint Publication 3-13.1, A-1). This phase can be omitted for 
simple, reflexive decisions. 
 The decision phase is where the commander makes his decisions based on the 
assumed reality of the operational area (Joint Publication 3-13.1, A-1). This decision has 
to be conveyed through a robust communication medium to get to the receiver.  
Finally, after reaching the decision, the commander takes action and actually 
impacts the operational area by his orders and instructions in the action phase. 
In order to achieve information superiority and become successful in conducting 
IO, one should be able to get into the adversary’s OODA loop by breaking it, slowing it 
down, and manipulating it so that it produces delays and incorrect actions. On the other 
hand, one should protect his or her OODA loop from hostile activities by hiding it from 
enemy information collection activities, keeping the cycle unbroken and robust, making it 
act faster than the enemy’s cycle, and sustaining the health of the OODA loop so that it 
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III.  INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND ELECTRONIC 
WARFARE 
Chapter V investigates one of the focus areas, the interaction and mutual 
relationship between each Information Operations (IO) competency and Electronic 
Warfare (EW). In order to understand these features, one must first understand the IO 
concept and be familiar with types of EW activities and subdivisions (disciplines). This 
chapter establishes a pathway to understanding IO-EW interactions by studying each 
competency and EW subdivision. 
A.  WHAT IS INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO)? 
1. Defining Information Operations 
Information Operations is defined as “the integrated employment of electronic 
warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), 
military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with 
specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp 
adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own” (Joint 
Publication 3-13, I-1). These components are considered as the major players in an 
Information Operations campaign. Electronic Warfare is omitted in this section as a core 
competency because it is discussed in detail in the following section. 
IO supporting capabilities—information assurance (IA), physical security, 
physical attack, counter-intelligence (CI), and combat camera (COMCAM)—directly or 
indirectly contribute to the effectiveness of IO. IO-related capabilities include public 
affairs (PA), civil military operations (CMO), and defense support to public diplomacy 
(DSPD) (Joint Publication 3-13, I-6). All core, supporting and related competencies can 
be seen in Table 1. 
The primary purpose or objective of IO related capabilities should not be 
compromised by IO; they should be coordinated and synchronized with the core and 




Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
Military Deception (MILDEC) 
Operations Security (OPSEC) 
Electronic Warfare (EW) 
CORE COMPETENCIES 
Computer Network Operations (CNO) 
Information Assurance (IA) 
Physical Security 
Physical Attack 
Counter Intelligence (CI) 
SUPPORTING 
COMPETENCIES  
Combat Camera (COMCAM) 
Public Affairs (PA) 
Civil Military Operations (CMO) 
RELATED  
COMPETENCIES  




Table 1. Information Operations (IO) Competencies (After Joint Publication 3-13, I-6) 
 
2.  Core Competencies of IO 
There are five core competencies of Information Operations, as seen in Figure 7. 
The core competencies are the major components in the conduct of IO; however, they 
should not be perceived as separate tools that can, by themselves, realize IO objectives. 
Instead, they should be considered as tools that allow an IO campaign to succeed by 
synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating with the other core, supporting and related 
competencies. Well-coordinated related and supporting competencies reinforce the power 




Figure 7.   IO Core Competencies 
 
a. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
Psychological operations have an important role in military operations. 
Mao emphasized that importance by indicating the mind of the enemy and the will of his 
leaders as a target that is much more important than the bodies of the troops they have As 
the purpose of psychological operations is to influence foreign decision makers to decide 
in friendly favor, it definitely makes a critical contribution beyond the normal kinetic 
goal of killing enemy soldiers. Psychological operations are defined as “planned 
operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to 
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of 
their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals; and the purpose of PSYOP is 
to introduce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s 
objectives” (Joint Publication 3-13, II-1). This can be achieved using appropriate means, 
such as radio, print, or other media. The advances in communication capabilities have 
also enhanced PSYOP means, but the effectiveness achieved is dependent on how the 
targeted audience perceives the message and on the credibility of that message. Figure 8 
shows the essentials for a successful PSYOP campaign (Joint Publication 3-53, I-1). 
Though they can be successful, PSYOP are not easy to conduct, because there are 

















like enemy counter-PSYOP activities effects, public affairs effects, and many others. 
Another important issue is the analysis and evaluation of the campaign. It is never easy to 
get the results of a PSYOP campaign; the results are not concrete, are mostly qualitative 
and typically require long periods of time to be observed. 
 
Figure 8.   Essentials of Success in a PSYOP Campaign (After Joint Publication 3-53, 
13)  
Due to the improvements in the communication means that are used when 
conveying PSYOP messages, it is increasingly likely to influence strategic audiences 
when making efforts at the tactical level. Communication mediums have facilitated 
reaching individuals at the very bottom level, such as radar operators and artillery 
personnel. They have introduced more means more powerful and immediate than radio 
broadcasting, leaflet bombs, and loudspeakers. The Internet and satellite broadcasting are 
examples of these new and powerful communication tools. 
b. Military Deception (MILDEC) 
Military Deception is one of the oldest tools used in the history of military 
action; an example is the Trojan Horse myth. According to an ancient Greek mythology, 
the Greeks defeated the Trojans by deceiving them with a giant wooden horse, presented 
as a gift. The Trojan’s accepted the gift into the city of Troy. The Greeks had placed men 
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inside the wooden horse. These men snuck out at night and opened the gates to the city, 
allowing the Greek army to enter Troy and defeat the Trojans.  
Looking at recorded history, deception played a critical role in the success 
of the Normandy invasion, as it caused the German command to make many critical 
errors in judgment (Joint Publication 3-58, I-2). The Allies used operations security, 
electronic deception, and fake military operations to support the Normandy invasion. 
These and other actions convinced the Germans to believe the intentionally conveyed 
themes, and thus to make incorrect decisions on Allied intentions and objectives due to a 
false visualization of the battlespace.   
Military deception is defined as the “actions executed to deliberately 
mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, 
and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions, or inactions that 
will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission” (Joint Publication 1-02, 
334). Sun-Tzu expresses the importance of military deception in warfare by saying “all 
warfare is based on deception” (Sun Tzu 2002, 42). The principles of military deception 
as presented in Table 2 are focus, objective, centralized control, security, timeliness, and 
integration. 
FOCUS Targeting the adversary’s decision-making process 




A deception must be controlled and directed by a single 
element; however, execution may be decentralized 
SECURITY Need-to-know criteria must be applied to each deception 
effort 
TIMELENESS Deception requires careful timing 
INTEGRATION MILDEC must be fully integrated and occur 
simultaneously with the operation planning 
Table 2.  The Principles of Military Deception (After Joint Publication 3-58, p. I-3) 
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The application of military deception goes back to the early stages of 
conflict history. In his book The Art of War, Sun-Tzu said, “when able to attack, we must 
seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must 
make the enemy believe that we are far away; when we are far away, we must make him 
believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy” (Sun Tzu 2002, 42).  This tactic 
is still valid and is what decision makers pursue today. The principles of MILDEC do not 
necessarily change, but its application to battlespace changes concurrent with 
technological development and advances in communications and networking.  
The goal of deception is to cause the adversary to make incorrect 
decisions. Deception does this by creating an apparent reality. Generally, this entails 
creating phenomena for the enemy to successfully observe.  This, however, depends on 
several conditional events: the adversary actually observes the phenomenon, thereby 
turning it into data; analyzes it into the desired information; and acts upon the 
information in the desired manner (Fogleman and Widnall 1995, 5). 
c. Operations Security (OPSEC) 
By its definition OPSEC is “a process of identifying critical information 
and subsequently analyzing friendly actions and other activities to: identify what friendly 
information is necessary for the adversary to have sufficiently accurate knowledge of 
friendly forces and intentions; deny adversary decision makers critical information about 
friendly forces and intentions; and cause adversary decision makers to misjudge the 
relevance of known critical friendly information because other information about friendly 
forces and intentions remain secure” (Joint Publication 3-13, II-3). It is clear in this 
definition that OPSEC is a process that can be applied to every operation, but should not 
be seen as a set of golden rules that provides security for military operations. It should be 
carefully studied in every operation concerning the specific requirements of that 
operation. 
Operations security should not be confused with communications security 
(COMSEC) or information security (INFOSEC). It is the process of identifying friendly 
critical information and then analyzing friendly actions to decide which friendly actions 
can be observed by the adversary. Then, one can determine what kind of indicators 
adversary intelligence systems can obtain, assess timely critical information, and take the 
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necessary precautions in order to eliminate or reduce these to an acceptable level of 
vulnerability (Joint Publication 3-54, I-1).  
d. Computer Network Operations (CNO) 
Along with electronic warfare, computer network operations is a 
capability that has evolved recently and has become very popular in a short time period. 
The reason for this is the increasing use of networking and information technologies (IT) 
infrastructure in military and civilian organizations. To attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, 
deny, exploit, and defend electronic information and infrastructures, CNO is comprised 
of computer network attack (CNA), computer network defense (CND), and computer 
network exploitation (CNE).  
Computer network attack is actions to disrupt, deny, and destroy 
information using computer networks. In some cases these actions might target the 
information within the network or computer, or the physical network or computer 
themselves. The purpose of computer network defense is to protect, monitor, detect, and 
respond to unauthorized activity within a specific network. Computer network 
exploitation involves actions taken to gather data from adversary automated information 
systems or networks (Joint Publication 3-13, II-5). 
Information Assurance (IA) is a very important part of computer network 
operations. It plays a major role in protecting computer networks and information 
technologies (IT) from hostile activities. IA focuses on the information itself, whereas 
computer network defense focuses on the machinery in which information resides. 
Therefore, IA and computer network defense are complimentary. In addition to adversary 
activities that threaten computer systems and networks, threats also come from hackers 
who attempt to access or contaminate sensitive information for fun. 
Again, the final core competency of IO, electronic warfare, will be 
discussed at length in section B of this chapter.   
3. Supporting Competencies of IO 
There are four IO supporting competencies that contribute to the effectiveness of 
the core competencies, as seen in Figure 9. These competencies are information 




Figure 9.   IO Supporting Competencies 
 
a. Information Assurance (IA) 
IA necessitates a defense-in-depth approach when integrating the 
capabilities of humans, operations, and technology. Defense-in-depth is based on the 
concept that multiple layers of security filling the gaps between them create greater 
security than can be achieved by any single protection mechanism. IA also helps establish 
a multilayer and multidimensional protection for mission accomplishment. IA is defined 
as “measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring its 
availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation” (Joint 
Publication 3-13, II-5). There is always a high possibility that information can be 
obtained from insiders. Even though series of multi-layered security systems can be 
established against an outsider, the vulnerability of the data being accessed by the insider 
still exists. There is always a possibility that even the most trusted employee or operator 
who is inside the network can still reveal the secret / secured data to outsiders 
Being interrelated, computer network defense and information assurance 
always depend on each other for effectiveness. IA activities are also often closely 
integrated with electronic protection (EP) activities. Some instances may show overlap 
between specific IA, CND, or EP activities, but integration of these activities should  
always be accomplished to eliminate this overlap. Otherwise there is a possibly that they 
will limit each other’s area of operation. The application of IA is inherent to all military 




















IA also involves computer and communications security 
(COMPUSEC/COMSEC). Computer security is the measures and controls taken to 
ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information processed and stored by a 
computer. Communications security is the measures and controls taken to deny 
unauthorized persons information obtained by means of telecommunications while also 
accomplishing their authenticity. It also includes crypto security, transmission security, 
emission security (EMSEC), and physical security of communications materials and 
information (Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5, 23). 
b. Physical Security 
Physical Security is one of the security measures that are taken against 
sabotage, damage, theft, and espionage to physically protect personnel, materials, and 
installations, and to prevent adversaries from gaining access to them. Physical security 
protects the means of possessing information and information systems physically, 
whereas IA protects information and information systems in the electronic environment. 
Determining vulnerabilities to known threats, applying appropriate deterrents, controlling 
and denying safeguard techniques and measures, and responding to changing conditions 
are also included in physical security. While IA protects and ensures the information 
itself, physical security protects the physical facilities in which information resides (Joint 
Publication 3-13, II-6). 
Physical security measures should be applied in order to deter, detect, and 
defend against threats from terrorists, criminals, and unconventional forces. Some of the 
examples of physical security are fencing, lighting and sensors, vehicle barriers, intrusion 
detection systems, and electronic surveillance and access control devices and systems. It 
is important to use physical security measures, overlapped and deployed in depth (Joint 
Publication 3-57, III-8). 
c. Physical Attack 
Physical attack is fundamental to military operations; destructive power is 
used to disrupt, destroy, and damage targets. For example, physical attack can be used to 
partially destroy adversary command and control, forcing operations with alternative 
means that may be exploitable by electronic warfare support resources. Physical attack 
can influence a target audience to act in ways favorable to friendly forces. It can also be 
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employed to attack command and control (C2) nodes to affect the adversary’s ability to 
carry out C2 missions (Joint Publication 3-13, II-7). Continuous physical attack also 
helps decrease the adversary’s morale and will to fight. GPS-guided munitions, precision-
guided munitions (PGM), and similar technologies should be used in order to minimize 
collateral damage.  
d. Counter-Intelligence (CI) 
CI is the information gathered and the activities conducted with the 
purpose of protecting against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or 
assassinations, which might be conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments, 
foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorists” (Joint Publication 3-13, 
II-7). It is a critical part of protecting friendly information. A robust security program 
should be established using OPSEC, CI, and physical security. 
e. Combat Camera (COMCAM) 
COMCAM supports combat, information, humanitarian, special force, 
intelligence, reconnaissance, engineering, legal, public affairs, and other operations for 
military purposes. To provide support, COMCAM acquires and utilizes still and motion 
imagery (Joint Publication 1-02, 97). COMCAM uses imagery in support of IO and can 
be intended to influence an adversary or support friendly forces (Joint Publication 3-13, 
II-8). COMCAM support is important when conducting visual battle damage assessment 
(BDA). COMCAM (see Figure 10) provides visualization of the battlefield and increases 
the credibility of Psychological Operations campaigns. 
 
Figure 10.   COMCAM Includes Still and Motion Imagery for Military Purposes (From 





4. Related Competencies of IO 
There are three IO related competencies that contribute to the effectiveness of the 
core and supporting competencies. Figure 11 shows these three related competencies: 
civil military operations (CMO), public affairs (PA), and defense support to public 
diplomacy (DSPD). These competencies are significant to IO and must always be 
coordinated and integrated with the IO competencies. 
           
Figure 11.   IO Related Competencies 
 
 
a. Public Affairs (PA) 
Public affairs is comprised of public and command information and 
community relations activities directed toward both external and internal audiences (Joint 
Publication 3-13, II-8). Credible public affairs is critical to the success of an overall IO 
campaign by influencing the adversary’s decision-making process. If the adversary thinks 
the information conveyed by PA is incorrect, then it seeks other sources to verify the 
message conveyed through PA activities. This might delay the appropriate decision, and 
it is not what PA intends to accomplish. PA contributes to the success of a military 
operation by countering adversary misinformation and disinformation by publishing the 
real and accurate information (Joint Publication 3-13, II-9). 
PA should not be confused with psychological operations. PSYOP aims to 
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the target audience (TA). There is a possibility that the enemy will use PA as an open 
intelligence source and act accordingly, however this is not the primary purpose of PA. 
This can be exploited by unknowingly conveying incorrect or deceptive information 
through PA channels. In addition, the internal audience should not be targeted with a 
PSYOP campaign, but PA can try to influence the internal audience through 
dissemination of accurate and timely information. 
b. Civil Military Operations (CMO) 
Civil military operations activities might take place before, during, or after 
a military operation and can include actions or functions which are normally the 
responsibility of the governing power in the area. Civil military operations are 
significantly due to the fact that they immediately affect the perceptions of the local 
populace. Civil military operations are defined as “the activities of a commander that 
establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental 
and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace” 
(Joint Publication 3-13, II-9). Some of the civil military operations missions in support of 
regional conflict and other combat operations are shown in Figure 12. 
The objectives of CMO are supporting national objectives, enhancing 
military effectiveness, and reducing the negative impact of military operations on society 
and civilian decision makers (Joint Publication 3-57, I-8). Civil military operations are 
conducted to minimize civilian interference with military operations and to maximize 
support for operations. CMO are conducted to meet the commander’s legal 
responsibilities and moral obligations to civilian populations in the theater (Joint 
Publication 3-57, I-1). 
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Figure 12.   Civil Military Missions in Support of Major Regional Conflicts and Other 
Combat Operations (From Joint Publication 3-57, I-10) 
 
c. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD) 
The activities and measures taken in order to support and facilitate public 
diplomacy efforts are called defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) (Joint 
Publication 1-02, 148). Defense support to public diplomacy helps promote foreign 
policy objectives by understanding, informing, and influencing foreign audiences and 
decision makers. It broadens the dialogue and cooperation among countries (Joint 
Publication 3-13, II-10). If used carefully, DSPD can be a great tool to help avoid 
conflict. 
B.  WHAT IS ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW)? 
1.  Some Definitions Related to Electronic Warfare 
It is useful to be familiar with the terms in this section in order to better 
understand the electromagnetic world. The definitions given here are also useful in 
understanding the relationships between the EW and IO competencies. 
Electromagnetic Spectrum: The range of frequencies of electromagnetic 















Figure 13.   Electromagnetic Spectrum (From NASA Official Website 2006 ) 
 
Operational Electromagnetic Energy   Operational electromagnetic energy is a 
combination of the power, frequency, and duration of the electromagnetic 
emissions that may be encountered by a military force while performing its 
assigned mission (Joint Publication 3-51, I-1). 
Directed Energy (DE)   DE is a general term that defines the technologies 
relating to the production of a beam of concentrated electromagnetic energy, 
atomic particles, or subatomic particles. It is used to damage or destroy an 
adversary’s equipment, personnel, and facilities (Joint Publication 3-51, I-4). A 
laser that blinds the sensors of an adversary is an example of a DE weapon. 
2.  Defining Electronic Warfare 
The first paragraph of the introduction to Joint Publication 3-51 explains the 
importance of EW as follows: 
Military operations are executed in an increasingly complex 
electromagnetic environment (EME). Today, electromagnetic (EM) 
devices are used by both civilian and military organizations for 
communications, navigation, sensing, information storage, and processing, 
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as well as a variety of other purposes. The increasing portability and 
affordability of sophisticated EM equipment guarantees that the EME in 
which military forces operate will become more complex in the future. 
The recognized need for military forces to have unimpeded access to and 
use of the EME creates vulnerabilities and opportunities for electronic 
warfare (EW) in support of military operations. In joint operations, EW is 
one of the integrated capabilities used to conduct information operations 
(IO). (Joint Publication 3-51, I-1) 
Electronic Warfare (EW) is defined as “any military action involving the use of 
EM or directed energy to control the EM spectrum or to attack the enemy” (Joint 
Publication 3-51, I-1). EW has three subdivisions: electronic protection (EP), electronic 
warfare support (ES), and electronic attack (EA). Figure 14 depicts the conceptual view, 
interrelation of subdivisions, and relationship of subdivisions to principal EW activities. 
These three activities are sometimes referred to as ‘electronic warfare disciplines’. 
 
 
Figure 14.   Concept of Electronic Warfare (From Joint Publication 3-51, I-3 ) 
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3. The Major Activities Performed in EW 
The principal activities of EW basically exploit the opportunities and 
vulnerabilities that the physics of electromagnetic energy dictate (Joint Publication 3-51, 
I-5). The capabilities shown in Table 3 are the basic capabilities that are used in the realm 
of EW. These capabilities should be well-coordinated and integrated to achieve the 
ultimate objective of the EW mission and final military campaign. Appropriate 
capabilities to a specific operation might be used individually or in concert. 
1 EM Compatibility (EMC) 9 Electronic Probing 
2 EM Deception 10 Electronic Reconnaissance 
3 EM Hardening 11 Electronic Intelligence 
4 EM Interference 12 Electronics Security 
5 EM Intrusion 13 Electronic Reprogramming 
6 EM Jamming 14 Emission Control (EMCON) 
7 EM Pulse 15 Spectrum Management 
8 Electronic Masking 
 
Table 3. The Principle Activities of Electronic Warfare ( After Joint Publication 3-51, I-5 
to I-8) 
 
EM Compatibility (EMC) is the ability of systems and devices to operate in the 
intended EM environment without causing an unacceptable level of degradation. EMC 
includes system design configurations and clear concepts and doctrines to ensure this 
ability. 
EM Deception is intentional radiation, re-radiation, alteration, denial, suppression, 
or reflection of EM energy with the purpose of providing misleading information to the 
enemy or enemy EM-dependent systems. 
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EM Hardening is the activities performed to protect personnel, facilities, and 
systems by filtering, attenuating, bonding, and grounding against unintentional affects of 
EM radiation. 
EM Intrusion is placing EM energy intentionally into EM transmission paths in 
order to deceive operators and create confusion. 
EM Interference is any EM-related disturbance that interrupts, obstructs, 
degrades, and limits the effectiveness of electronics and electrical equipment. This 
interference can be intentional or unintentional. 
EM Jamming is a deliberate radiation, re-radiation, or reflection of EM energy to 
reduce or prevent the enemy from effectively using the EM spectrum, thus degrading or 
neutralizing combat capability. 
EM Pulse is a strong pulse, commonly due to a nuclear explosion, that produces 
damaging current and voltages to disable electronic and electrical devices. 
Electronic Masking is done to protect the friendly radiation against hostile 
electronic warfare support and signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities. It is basically 
controlled radiation of EM energy of friendly frequencies. 
Electronic Probing is the deliberate radiation to be introduced into a potential 
adversary’s devices and systems. Doing so enables friendly forces to learn about the 
functions and capabilities of hostile devices and systems. 
Electronic Reconnaissance is the detection, location, identification, and evaluation 
of EM radiation. 
Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) is the intelligence gained from foreign non-
communications EM radiations. Intelligence can be technical, geolocational, or both. 
Electronics Security is the activity designed to deny unauthorized persons access 
to valuable information, resulting in protection of friendly systems from activities like 
interception or non-communications radiations. 
Electronic Reprogramming is purposefully made alterations or modifications of 
EW and target sensitive systems to adopt the changes in equipment, tactics, and the EM 
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environment. These changes might be due to friendly or hostile activities. The desired 
result of electronic reprogramming is to sustain and to increase the effectiveness of EW 
and target sensitive systems and devices used in defensive or offensive weapons and 
intelligence collection systems. 
Emission Control (EMCON) is the selective and controlled use of EM, acoustic, 
and other emitters to achieve optimum C2 capabilities. EMCON measures include 
limiting the detection by enemy sensors and mutual interference among friendly systems  
Spectrum Management is planning, coordinating, and managing the EM 
spectrum. The objective is to create an EM environment in which friendly electronic 
systems can perform their functions without interference or confusion (Joint Publication 
3-51, I-6-7). 
4. EW Subdivisions  
Electronic Warfare (EW) is a term that includes a number of different electronic 
technologies for intelligence gathering and interfering with enemy operations. Electronic 
Intelligence (ELINT), or eavesdropping, has been going on since the invention of the 
telephone and telegraph (Schroer 2003, 49). Electronic warfare has three subdivisions as 
presented in Figure 14; electronic attack (EA), electronic warfare support (ES), and 
electronic protection (EP). 
a. Electronic Attack (EA) 
Electronic attack is the subdivision of EW that involves the use of EM 
energy, EM pulses, directed energy weapons (DEW) – which include high-energy lasers 
(HEL), charged particle beams (CPB), neutral particle beams (NPB), and high power 
microwave (HPM) – and anti-radiation weapons (ARMs). EA targets facilities, 
equipment, and personnel in order to destroy, neutralize, or degrade. Jamming and 
electromagnetic deception are good examples of EA. On the other hand, lasers designed 
to disrupt and blind optical sensors, RF weapons, and particle weapons that use EM 
energy as the primary destructive system are also examples of EA (Joint Publication 3-
51, I-2). 
The old term electronic countermeasure (ECM) is now obsolete and EA 
should be used instead. EA can be considered a type of fire that can be non-destructive as 
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well as destructive. For instance, jamming and spoofing are types of EA that are non-
destructive, sometimes called ‘soft kill’. The use of anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) and 
directed energy weapons (DEW) are types of EA that are destructive, or ‘hard kill’. EA 
plays a significant role in almost all operations directed to C2 (Joint Publication 3-13, II-
6). 
Some other examples of EA are chaff, noise jamming, false targets, angle 
deception, and decoys. Chaff is one of the simplest and most widely used  
countermeasures. Originally chaff was composed of strips of metal foil but now consists 
of metal-coated dielectric fibers, thousands of which are stored in a small space.  
Noise jamming, similar to thermal noise, increases the level of background 
noise to make the target returns undetectable (Stimson 1998, 439–440). A false target 
creates false target returns and thus confuses the operator and makes him unable to 
identify the real target return. Transponders and repeaters are used to create false returns 
(Stimson 1998, 446). Angle deception introduces angle-tracking errors in an enemy’s fire 
control radar or radar-guided missile which make the enemy missile miss its target. 
Cross-eye and terrain bounce jamming are techniques to accomplish angle deception 
(Stimson 1998, 450). Radar decoys are employed to confuse an enemy and draw the radar 
or the seeker of a radar-guided missile away from the deploying aircraft. Some types of 
decoys are expendable and towed (Stimson 1998, 453). 
EA capabilities will grow along with the growth of radar capabilities. EA 
is becoming more sophisticated. The developments indicate that RF coverage and the 
responsiveness of noise jammers will increase and their escort and stand-off effectiveness 
will increase as well. Deception EA will advance and false targets will become more 
deceptive; they will become capable of showing realistic flight profiles of aircraft. EA 
systems will become more intelligent and responsive. They will adapt to the changes in 
the environment, like changes in radar characteristics and even waveforms (Stimson 
1998, 454). 
b. Electronic Protection (EP) 
Replacing the old terminology of electronic counter countermeasure 
(ECCM), electronic protection (EP) is “active and passive means taken to protect 
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personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly and enemy employment 
of EW that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability” (Joint Publication 
3-51, I-2).  
Examples are electronic masking, goggles filtering out harmful 
wavelengths of laser light, EW reprogramming, frequency deconfliction, and protection 
from friendly and enemy EW. Some advanced EP techniques are sidelobe cancellation, 
mainlobe jamming cancellation, vastly increased RF bandwidths, sensor fusion, offensive 
EP, and application of artificial intelligence (AI) to EP development. 
c. Electronic Warfare Support (ES) 
ES includes actions to search for, intercept, and identify enemy use of the 
EM spectrum. It also locates and localizes EM radiation, both intentional as well as 
unintentional.  
The primary purpose of ES during these activities is immediate threat 
recognition, targeting, planning, and conducting future operations. The information 
required for conducting other EW operations, targeting, and homing is provided by this 
subdivision. This data can also be used to produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), 
measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), and battle damage assessment 
(BDA) (Joint Publication 3-51 I-2). MASINT is technically derived intelligence that 
detects, locates tracks, identifies, and describes the unique characteristics of fixed and 
dynamic target sources. Measurement and signature intelligence capabilities include 
radar, laser, optical, infrared, acoustic, nuclear radiation, radio frequency, 
spectroradiometric, and seismic sensing systems as well as gas, liquid, and solid materials 
sampling and analysis (Joint Publication 1-02, 328) 
Laser warning receivers (LWR) that are used to detect and analyze a laser 
signal, threat warning, collection systems and direction finding systems (DF) are 
examples of electronic warfare support. ES is the term that replaced electronic support 
measures (ESM). 
Threat warning is technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, 
tracks, identifies, and describes the unique characteristics of fixed and dynamic target 
sources. Direction finding is a procedure for obtaining bearings of radio frequency 
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emitters by using a highly directional antenna and a display unit on an intercept receiver 
or ancillary equipment (Joint Publication 1-02, 160). 
As technology advances there are always new techniques and tactics 
introduced into EW. Under any circumstances, it is vital that all three subdivisions of EW 
be coordinated, integrated and synchronized for the achievement of the military campaign 
objective. Even though they may seem to be separate disciplines, one must understand all 
three subdivisions to be able to understand the EW ‘umbrella’. EW is not only a 
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IV. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF EW AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF IO  
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF EW 
Superior weapons and superior tactics have always conferred advantage in 
war; the development of measure and countermeasure is a major thread 
running through the history of human conflict, and Man’s use of 
electricity, electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum in war has been 
no exception…evolution of electronic warfare from the American Civil 
War to the present day…shows that many of the basic principles of what 
we now call ‘Electronic Warfare’ are far from new. (Browne and Thurbon 
1998, 3) 
The history of Electronic Warfare does not actually begin with the Second World 
War as most people think. In fact, the roots of Electronic Warfare history can even be 
found in the U.S. Civil War in 1861. Until the large scale use of the telegraph, invented in 
1837 by Samuel F.B. Morse, the primary communication means between the Navy 
Department in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Navy Pacific Squadron was a dispatch 
vessel. But “speaking wires” spread so quickly that in 1858 a trans-Atlantic link was 
established, and the use of telegraph cables over the land became commonplace. With the 
outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, telegraph wires became one of the most important 
targets for cavalry. Union forces were more vulnerable to these cavalry raids than the 
Confederation forces, because the Union forces used the telegraph extensively (see 
Figure 15). Cavalry men switched military telegraph traffic to the wrong destinations, 
transmitted false orders to Union commanders, and also cut the wires to deny the 
information to the Union forces (Price 1984, 1–2). 




Figure 15.    Telegraph Activities During US Civil War (left) and Telegraph Wagon 
(right) (1864) (From Civil War Homepage 2006) 
 
Military commanders were able to establish fast and accurate communications 
over long distances with the telegraph, making its use attractive to both sides of the 
conflict. These can be considered as early applications of   Command, Control, 
Communications, and Intelligence (C3I). The cavalry of both sides were trying to disrupt 
the other side’s ability to employ effective C3I. These tactics are early examples of 
signals intelligence, jamming, and deception (Browne and Thurbon 1998, 3). Although 
the telegraph can not be considered a part of electronic warfare because it does not 
radiate electromagnetic energy, it is important to understand these early counter-C3I 
tactics as they relate to modern EW techniques, albeit in different forms. 
1. Before and During the First World War 
In 1888, German Heinrich Hertz demonstrated that “…electrical sparks would 
propagate signals into the space.” This demonstration stimulated interest in Hertzian 
waves and led to the development of a radio system in England which was able to 
transmit Morse signals over 100 yards in 1895. Within two years, Italian Guglielma 
Marconi sent and received signals over two miles. With the increased range, radio 
communications became suitable for marine communications. In 1899 Marconi radio sets 
increased the transmission range to 89 miles (Price 1984, 1–3). 
It was not long until the denial of this capability was achieved, spawning what we 
now think of as Electronic Warfare (EW). The first known instance of deliberate 
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jamming was surprisingly not for military, but for civilian purposes during America’s 
Cup yacht races in 1901 in the United States. 
The first recorded instance of deliberate radio jamming took place in 
September 1901, in the U.S. Interestingly, it was aimed at securing 
commercial gain rather than military advantage. As now, there was 
considerable public interest in the America’s Cup yacht races, and the 
newspaper first to reach the stands carrying each result stood to reap a 
large profit. In that year, Marconi obtained a contract from Associated 
Press...Another company,…Wireless Telegraph Company of America, 
secured a contract…A third company, the American Wireless Telephone 
and Telegraph Co., …failed to get a sponsor but decided to exploit the 
situation (and)…used a transmitter more powerful than its competitors, 
and one of its engineers, John Pickard, worked out a method which 
allowed him to jam signals from the other companies while at the same 
time reporting on the progress of the race from his boat…thus only AWT 
& T was able to pass accurate reports on the races (Price 1984, 3). 
Soon thereafter, the first intentional use of radio jamming by the military took 
place in 1902 during British Navy Fleet exercises in the Mediterranean. This was 
followed in 1903 during U.S. Navy Fleet maneuvers. The exercise group was divided into 
two squadrons, White and Blue. Both sides carried radios. As part of the exercise, the 
Blue Squadron was directed to use radio communications for enemy sighting reports and 
maneuvers, while the White Squadron was directed to attempt jamming of this use. Due 
to the interference of an officer who didn’t understand the speed of transmission and 
reception, and who wanted to listen to the entire Blue transmission rather than interfere 
with it, jamming of the Blue Squadron signals was not attempted until transmission of the 
critical message was completed, negating its impact. The White Squadron was 
intercepted and soundly defeated by the Blue (Price 1984, 4). This is the first recorded 
instance of a conflict between two opposing interests which still exists today; those who 
want to listen to the enemy radio signals for intelligence and those who want to jam them 
to deny information to the enemy.  
In the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), radio jamming was used purposefully to 
gain tactical advantage. This was the first war in which both sides used radio. While 
Japanese cruisers bombarded Port Arthur, smaller ships equipped with radio observed the 
fall of rounds and passed corrections. A Russian operator on the shore heard these 
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Japanese signals and used his spark transmitter to jam them. Therefore, the Russian 




Figure 16.   A First World War Mobile Royal Navy Direction Finding (DF) Station 
(From Browne and Thurbon 1998, 6)  
 
From 1905 to 1914 there were significant improvements in Wireless Telegraphy 
(WT) systems: 
• Transmission ranges were improved. 
• Bandwidths were reduced to accommodate more channels 
• The number of available channels improved. 
• Mutual interference was reduced 
• There were advances in transmitter and receiver technology with 
improved reception 
• Size and weight of WT sets were reduced to fit aircraft, which was a 
milestone in air-ground communications (Browne and Thurbon 1998, 4). 
 
Means to exploit the EM environment continued to be developed.  “In 1906, the 
U.S. Navy installed a primitive direction finder (DF) on the coal ship Lebanon for tests, 
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but it demonstrated limited capability” (Price 1984, 5). By the beginning of World War I, 
radio jamming was widely used by many nations. In the early months of 1915, the Royal 
Navy began to establish a chain of DF stations along the east coast of England as shown 
in Figure 16. The purpose was to locate ships or aircrafts by the bearings of these stations 
(Price 1984, 6). 
Air-ground communication using radio during World War I was very important 
for reconnaissance and artillery spotting purposes. Although there was little deliberate 
jamming, most of jamming resulted from too many friendly aircraft flying very closely 
(Schroer 2003, 49). 
Up to this point, the importance of encrypting a message was not fully 
understood. The Germans demonstrated this importance with their victory at Tannenberg 
over the Russians. The communications between Russian headquarters were unencrypted 
and the Germans were able to intercept and read them. Despite this realization of the 
importance of encryption, the Germans were unable to appreciate the vulnerability of 
their own codes and ciphers (Browne and Thurbon 1998, 5). Close to the end of WWI, 
the German U-boat Fleet became an important threat to Allied shipping and was a main 
target for Allied wireless intelligence. However it was not easy to track German 
submarines. After the U.S. Navy installed a ship-borne wireless DF capability for use in 
anti-submarine warfare, the Allied wireless intelligence service was able to track almost 
all German submarines in the North Sea, the Mediterranean, and the North Atlantic, even 
though they kept communications traffic to a minimum. In fact, Allied forces were 
helped by the German Naval Command who then thought that their codes and ciphers 
were unbreakable, and who underestimated the capabilities of Allied forces (Browne and 
Thurbon 1998, 7). 
Table 4 shows the important events that took place before and during WWI, 






 1837 Samuel F.B. Morse invents telegraph 
1858 The U.S. and Britain establish a trans-Atlantic undersea 
cable for communication. 
1861 During the U.S. Civil War, the telegraph becomes an 
important target for enemy cavalry. 
    Early 1870 James Clark Maxwell’s theory established the basis of 
propagation of electromagnetic waves in free space. 
1888 German Heinrich Hertz demonstrated electrical sparks 
propagating signals into space. 
1895 Captain H. Jackson’s radio system transmits Morse signal 
over 100 yards in England. 
1897 Italian Guglielma Marconi sends and receives signals over 
two miles. 
1899 Marconi radio sets are able to pick up signals from 89 
miles. 
1901 The first recorded instance of deliberate radio jamming 
takes place in the U.S. 
1902 The first intentional radio jamming for military purpose 
takes place in the Mediterranean. 
 1904–1905 During the Russo-Japanese War, radio jamming is used 
purposefully for tactical gain. 
1906 The U.S. Navy installed a primitive direction finder on the 
coal ship Lebanon for tests. 
   1914–1915 There is a wide use of radio jamming; The Royal Navy 
establishes a chain of direction finding (DF) stations. 
1917 The U.S. Navy installs a ship-borne wireless DF capability 
to conduct anti-submarine warfare. 
 
Table 4. Important Events Relating to Electronic Warfare through World War I 
 
 
2. 1919 to the End of Second World War 
The period between the world wars included significant developments in 
electronic engineering. As a result of these developments, radio navigation aids and radar 
became great tools and played major roles in WWII. These two technologies also brought 
great complexity into the electronic warfare world and increased the amount of effort that 
was dedicated to conducting electronic warfare (Browne and Thurbon 1998, 10). The 
significant developments that made way for radar to play a major role in World War II 
are as follows: 
47 
• The performance and reliability of equipment was improved. 
• The reception and transmission of higher frequencies became possible. 
• RT systems became smaller and lighter. 
• RT systems became available for short-range communications. 
• Knowledge of the use of the electromagnetic spectrum expanded.  
After World War I, a great effort was made by the U.S. Naval Research 
Laboratory (NRL) to improve communication between ships, aircraft, and ground 
stations. In 1926, NRL focused their efforts on avoiding enemy detection and detecting 
enemy transmissions and creating interference for the enemy. 
In the early 1930s came the initial development of Radio Detection and Ranging 
(RADAR). Powerful transmitters, sensitive receivers, and sufficient antenna 
directionality enabled the development of RADAR (Price 1984, 7). NRL developed an 
“interference detector” as early as 1922 and was able to detect signals up to 50 miles 
away by 1934. During this period, Great Britain and Germany were also developing their 
own similar capabilities. In 1935, the British detected an aircraft at 17 miles with pulsed 
radar operating at 11 MHz, and in 1936 they extended the range to 75 miles. On the other 
hand, German radars operating at 600 MHz detected an aircraft from 12 miles away. The 
U.S., of course, did not lag behind, and a 200 MHz XAF radar detected an aircraft at 100 
miles and ships at 15 miles, limited by the curvature of the Earth and the antenna height 
of the radar.  
After these significant developments in the radar world, experts began to think 
about whether the location of the transmitter could be denied or defeated. This led to the 
first airborne jamming test which took place in London, where an interrupted, continuous 
wave transmitter was used. Immediately after this test, anti-jamming systems were 
integrated into the Chain Home radar systems along the coast of England, shown in 
Figure 17. The Chain Home was Great Britain’s first operational air defense radar 
system. These anti-jamming systems were the first examples of electronic counter 
counter-measures (ECCM) (Price 1984, 9–10). In 1939, just before the outbreak of World 
War II, the first instance of airborne electronic intelligence (ELINT) occurred. An ELINT 
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mission was being carried out by the German airship Graf Zeppelin as it was cruising 
along the east coast of Great Britain. It was intercepting, recording, and assessing the 
radiation potential threat to the Luftwaffe that was coming from tall towers, the Chain 
Home radar system.  Meanwhile, many experiments and developments took place in the 
U.S. Prior to entering World War II, the U.S. possessed radars, high frequency direction 




Figure 17.   The Chain Home Low Station at Hopton on the Norfolk Coast (From 
Browne and Thurbon 1998, 14) 
 
1940 was the year of the ‘Battle of Beams’ for Germany and the United Kingdom 
(UK). Using radio navigation systems, one of which was called Knickebein, the Germans 
acquired an accurate night bombing capability over ranges up to 200 nautical miles 
(NM). This was a development originally generated using the German Lorenz 
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Company’s “blind approach” navigation system. As seen in Figure 18, two transmitted 
beams were arranged so that one transmits dots and the other transmits dashes. As a result 
the overlapping beams created a center line of continuous notes and following this note, 
pilots were able to navigate accurately in the dark of night. In early 1940, the UK was 
unaware of this German navigation system. Through the gathering of isolated small 
pieces of intelligence and limited use of the German Knickebein system, the British 
gained knowledge about how the Germans were able to navigate to London in the dark. 
The British modified their systems and employed jamming to defeat the Lorenz Beams, 
which eventually undermined German confidence in their night navigation system. 
 
Figure 18.    Arrangement of Beams in Lorenz Blind Approach System (From Browne 
and Thurbon 1998, 10) 
 
Later, the British-developed “Y” radio monitoring stations and put counter-
measures into them. Had the German Lorenz system not been recognized early and 
appropriate measures not been taken rapidly, the British could have been in a disastrous 
position due to German night bombardment ability. 
The British developed a new EW system, the Mandrel. This was an airborne radar 
noise jammer. It was used to counter Freya radars by radiating signals to swamp the 
normal return echo, thereby obliterating formation size and range information. Freya 
radars were early warning radars that were being used by Germany to intercept and target 
British during German night bombardment   Signals intercept by Mandrel and 







photographic reconnaissance revealed the secrets of the Freya radar sites. Following 
1944, programs in the U.S., Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union gave 
fruit and radars were being installed on aircraft on a large scale. Meanwhile, the Germans 
increased the frequency range of Freya radars and reduced its jamming susceptibility by 
spreading its power in order to degrade the effectiveness of Mandrel.  
At this point, a new kind of counter-measure against radar came into play: chaff, 
or “window” as the British called it (the German’s referred to it as “duppel”). Chaff is 
basically a half-wave dipole which creates a strong radar return and echo that helps the 
target conceal itself from the radar. After some debate over using it, chaff was deployed, 
used, and proved effective against German radars (Browne and Thurbon 1998, 12–19). 
Chaff was sized to cover a range of frequencies and released in bundles. When the 
bundles opened in the air, they dispersed wide and large to produce false target echoes. 
The dispersion of the chaff depended upon altitude, weather, wind direction, and speed. 
EW became a cat-and-mouse game as the pendulum swung from EP to EA and back to 
EA (Schroer 2003, 51). It was a constant game of measures, counter-measures, and 
counter-counter measures. 
There were also some applications of EW in the Pacific after the war in Europe 
was over, but there were no major EW technology developments. Immediately after 
World War II, development of U.S. electronic attack went dormant as other electronics 
developed. When the Soviet threat was recognized, the first priority became electronic 
intelligence (ELINT) activities to monitor Soviet radar deployment (Schroer 2003, 52). 
3. 1946 to the First Gulf War  
The most significant advances in electronic warfare that carry it to the modern 
day occurred particularly after the Second World War. However, if not for the inventions 
and development prior to and during Second World War, these significant advances 
could never have been realized.  
Many of the advances in tactics and technology occurred during the Vietnam 
War; air tactics began to change in order to better benefit and counter electronic warfare 
capabilities. Electronic warfare officers (EWOs) or “Crows” played a major role in this 
conceptual change in air tactics during the Vietnam War. An interview about the Wild 
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Weasels with a current member of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) faculty who 
served as a USAF EWO is located in Appendix B. 
a. EW during the Korean War (1950–1953) and U-2 Missions 
During the Korean War, under the command of General MacArthur, the 
U.S. deployed 100 B-29 Superfortress heavy bomber aircraft to the theater. The North 
Korean Air Force had no effective means to counter the B-29 during the first five months 
of the war. This changed when the Chinese forces joined North Korea and the transonic 
MiG-15 jet fighter deployed to airfields in nearby Manchuria. The MiG-15 made life 
hazardous for bombers, restricting them to operate solely at night. The North Koreans 
also installed early-warning radars and radar-controlled anti-aircraft-artillery (AAA). 
Although countermeasures existed, the B-29s were not allowed to use chaff against the 
enemy radars or to jam the fighter communications frequencies because this would reveal 
U.S. EW capabilities that were reserved for the potential of a conflict with the Soviet 
Union. Only spot jamming of the AAA fire control radars was allowed. Consequently, 
aircraft losses became unacceptable. By October 1951, it was clear that darkness by itself 
was not a good cover and the restrictions on the use of chaff and the jamming of fighter 
control channels had to be abolished (Browne and Thurbon 1998, 26). Not applying the 
lessons learned from the Second World War demonstrated the harsh reality and critical 
nature of the EW mission in air warfare.  
After this lesson, the USAF Strategic Air Command rebuilt the EW 
capability of its aircraft and EW crew members began to be considered as part of 
operational requirements, with simulators built to train the crew in electronic warfare.  
Continuing into the early 1950s, the first operational surface-to-air missile 
(SAM) system, the SA-1 Guild, was built and deployed around Moscow. The more 
capable SA-2 Guideline quickly replaced the old SA-1 system. The SA-2 uses a Fan 
Song track-while-scan (TWS) radar to command-guided a missile; that is, guides its 
missile to the target by command signals from a ground controller system. The SA-2 
Launcher and radar set is displayed in Figure 19. These Russian advancements stimulated 
the West and led to the development of various technologies critical to EW, such as 
transistors, traveling wave tubes (TWT), and spiral antennas. The development of 
airborne EW systems reduced the effectiveness of ground-based air defenses, requiring 
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more power, more complex jammer suites, and more money. More modern and capable 
aircraft were being used for Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) missions. The largest U.S. 
ELINT aircraft of the period was the Convair RB-36, which was equipped with a 
comprehensive EW suite. 
 
        
 
Figure 19.   SA-2 Guideline SAM and Its Radar Set (From Military Analysis Network 
(a) 2006) 
  
By the early 1950s, the U.S. intelligence community needed images of 
Soviet radars. These images would be used for evasion and targeting purposes. The only 
method available to gain these images was by flying low over the targets and taking 




President Truman. Instead, three USAF RB-45Cs were painted with Royal Air Force 
(RAF) markings and performed the mission. The use of aircraft for such missions led to 
the development of the U-2. 
The U-2 was designed for electronic intelligence (ELINT) and 
reconnaissance purposes.  Information such as the frequency and detailed circuitry of an 
emitter are important to employ effective electronic protection (EP) as well as to conduct 
electronic attack (EA). U-2s not only photographed military and industrial installations 
but also collected signals intelligence (SIGINT) on operating radars.  
The intelligence collected by U-2s was very valuable because it could help 
determine characteristics of the enemy emitters and even defense system structure. The 
following intelligence was typically collected by U-2s: 
• The frequency of the enemy emitter. Intelligence officers can 
deduct how accurate targets can be plotted, how well can it see 
through the rain and cloud. 
• The rate at which a radar beam can be made to scan through an 
aircraft. It is possible to deduce the purpose of radar; 360 degrees 
search radar, height finder, locking radar, or missile control radar 
• The rate at which the radar pulses are transmitted. The maximum 
usable range of radar can be determined. 
• Time width of the radar pulses. The resolution or discrimination 
ability among many aircraft flying together can be learned. 
• Signals that are picked up. The location of the emitter can be 
calculated. This can relate to the area where defense is strong 
backed up by many types of radar (Price 1977, 256). 
After a few successful flights, a U-2B was shot down, leading to a U.S. 
government ban of U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union. It became clear that high altitude 
on its own did not provide enough protection from long-range SAM systems (Browne 
and Thurbon 1998, 27–28). There were four possible ways of increasing the probability 
of survival for a manned aircraft under these circumstances: 
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• Fly even higher and faster and use EW systems to degrade the 
performance of defensive systems. 
• Fly even higher and faster and use stand-off weapons to stay clear 
of the lethal range in most heavily defended areas. 
• Fly so low and so fast that ground clutter and terrain masking 
reduced radar effectiveness. 
• Fly so low and so fast that exposure times were short enough to 
make effective engagements unlikely. 
The first new U.S. strategic reconnaissance aircraft developed following 
the shoot-down and guideline establishment was the SR-71, and the B-52, B-58, and RAF 
V-Bombers were modified or developed with these guidelines in mind. In the late 1950s, 
the Quail radar decoy missile was introduced. Launched from a B-52, it gave the 
appearance of a small aircraft. To complement the illusion, it could carry and employ 
jamming transmitters to simulate a bomber (Price 1977, 254). The development of EW 
was stimulated by the military competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and 
served a role in maintaining a critical balance of mutual deterrence (Browne and Thurbon 
1998, 30). 
During the late 1950s, space came into play in the EW world. The US 
Moonbounce program collected radiation from Soviet radars after it was  
 
reflected from the surface of the moon and back to the Earth. A number of these 
observations were able to provide useful intelligence to the U.S., unknown by the Soviet 
Union. 
b. EW during the Vietnam War (1957–1953) 
The U.S. did not initially intend to fight the war in Vietnam itself, but 
rather intended to provide military assistance to the South Vietnamese to defend 
themselves. With the deterioration of the South Vietnamese military and political 
situation, U.S. support and involvement in operations increased to the point that the U.S. 
conducted most of the fighting. During this entire period, air operations were firmly 
controlled by the U.S. military. 
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The U.S. wanted to keep the Soviet Union and China out of the conflict 
and at the same time to reduce any adverse public opinion. The cost of these political 
decisions was high; between 1964 and 1973, 4,700 aircraft were shot down by fighters, 
AAA, small arms fire, and SAMs. This was partly due to the fact that limitations and 
restrictions were placed on air operations, reducing their effectiveness and placing the 
crews at greater risk.  
Aircraft from the USS Coral Sea detected the first SA-2s sighted in 
Vietnam. This SAM was infamous for shooting down two U-2s. It was designed to take 
down high-flying U-2 and V-Bomber threats. The SA-2 had a range of about 20 NM and 
a ceiling of approximately 80,000 feet. The introduction of the SA-2 to Vietnam forced 
the U.S. to change tactics; aircraft were forced down to low altitudes where they were 
within the range of AAA. The losses to AAA and ground fire began to mount, 
necessitating a solution. The North Vietnamese deployed around 200 early-warning and 
ground-controlled interception (GCI) radars, and around 2,000 AAA.  
This solution to SAMs was partly found with the development of the Wild 
Weasel mission (Browne and Thurbon 1998, 30). The first Radar Homing and Warning 
(RHAW) system, the AN/APR-25, was developed in 1965 and was used to equip the F-
100F ‘Wild Weasel’ aircraft. This RHAW system not only detected radar emissions, but 
also displayed the relative bearing of the emitter and gave warning to the crew if the 
aircraft was being tracked by threat radars.  
With this equipment, the USAF developed the tactics that would mark 
these special crews as Wild Weasels. They were special units comprised of fighter-
bomber aircraft and crews that engaged the enemy radar-guided surface-to-air missile and 
gun batteries. These units provided cover to other fighter-bombers attacking conventional 
targets. As the state of the technology progressed, the Wild Weasels were armed with 
Shrike and Standard anti-radiation missiles (ARM) which homed in on the signals from 
the enemy radar (Price 1977, 265) (see Figure 21). 
Four two-seat North American F-100Fs were fitted with suites 
comprising RHAW, radar signal analysis and missile launch warning 
receiver systems, manned by experienced F-100 pilots and Electronic 
Warfare Officers (EWO, or Crows) from SAC’s B-52 fleet, and flown 
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on missions over North Vietnam from the beginning of December 1965. 
They flew ahead of the attack aircraft to tempt SA-2 sites into revealing 
themselves and attacked those that did with rockets, napalm, cannon, 
and from March 1966, with Texas instruments AGM-45 Shrike Anti-
Radiation Missiles (ARM). The  F-100Fs destroyed a number of SA-2 
sites over the next six months, kept many more closed down during 
critical phases of attacks, and developed the basic Wild Weasel tactics 
before they were replaced from May 1966 by similarly equipped, but 
faster, two-seat Republic F-105Fs. Subsequent improvements to the 
electronics and weapons, including the introduction of General 
Dynamics AGM-78 Standard ARM which weighed over 1,350 lbs and 
had a range of some 13.5 NM, produced the F-105G which began to 
replace F-105Fs from April 1968 (Browne and Thurbon 1998, 33). 
Along with the development of the Wild Weasels, the U.S. also introduced 
the first tactical jamming pods to be fitted on fighter-bomber aircraft. These new 
technologies, such as the Quick Reaction Capability (QRC)-160 pods, and later the 
AN/ALQ-87 family of communication and radar jamming pods, provided protection to 
tactical aircraft beginning in 1965. 
Nearing the end of the war during Linebacker II, which was the second of 
a series of air operations with the order of “to win this war” over the Vietnam air defense, 
the internal EW suites provided self protection when bombing from high altitude. During 
the bombardment, F-105G Wild Weasels and General Dynamics F-111s attacked the 
North Vietnamese SAM sites and airfields while EB-66s provided stand-off jamming. 
Linebacker II was proof that “a powerful barrage of electronic jamming, combined with 
vast quantities of chaff and carefully evolved anti-missile tactics backed by Wild Weasel 
attacks on the launching sites could reduce the effectiveness of the air defense system 
(ADS) (Price 1977, 271). The loss rate was significantly reduced by the coordination of 
effective tactics with electronic warfare techniques. There are many more lessons learned 
from the Vietnam War than can not be presented here, but some of them are: 
• Effective EW capability is crucial for air operations and aircraft 
survivability in a well-integrated and effective enemy air defense 
environment. Wild Weasel aircraft, RHAW systems and jamming pods 
provided the proof of this assertion. 
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• Combining airborne surveillance and control, air defense, attack, EW, and 
reconnaissance aircraft in tightly coordinated strike packages was essential 
to attacks on heavily defended targets in Vietnam. 
• It was a clear message to the world that proliferation of airborne EW 
systems, realistic EW training, and an escalating air defense threat was 
gaining importance in battles (Browne and Thurbon 1998, 34). 
c. Yom Kippur (1973) and the Bekaa Valley (1982) 
In October 1973, Syria and Egypt launched a massive attack against Israel 
to regain the territory they lost in the 1967 Six Day War. The Israeli pilots were familiar 
with the SA-2 and SA-3 systems, which were effective against high-flying aircraft, but 
they had little knowledge of the SA-6 system deployed by the Soviets. This SAM 
employed semi-active radar homing and was more accurate and jam resistant than 
previous SAM systems. Mounting fire control radars and missile launchers on tracked 
vehicles gave the system excellent mobility. Because the SA-6 had not been previously 
exploited, and had its first operational use during this conflict, there had not been enough 
opportunity to properly prepare electronic warfare systems to deal with this new threat. 
Moreover, it was complemented by the ZSU 23-4 anti-aircraft gun system that targets 
low-flying aircrafts. Also deployed into the air defense system was the SA-7 IR-guided 
MANPAD SAM. SA-6 and SA-7 MANPADs can be seen in Figure 20. The SA-7 was a 
small man-portable heat-seeking anti-aircraft missile that was effective against 
helicopters and slower low-flying aircraft. Facing these new threats, the Israelis initially 
suffered heavy losses, with more than eighty Israeli aircraft destroyed during the first 
week of the war and many more damaged (Price 1977, 273). This shows the importance 
of deploying new equipment that can surprise an enemy having no knowledge or 
measures to counter a new threat. 
Having painfully learned from this experience, Israel invested heavily in 
C3I and EW systems; airborne, rocket and artillery propelled defense suppression 
weapons; intelligence gathering; planning; and training. These investments benefited 
Israel during their 1982 conflict with Syria. Israel’s plan for the invasion of south 
Lebanon started with attacks by aircraft on Palestine Liberation Organization bases on 
June 4th, and continued with a ground force advance up the coastal plain towards Beirut 
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on the 6th. The Syrian Air Force tried to disrupt the Israeli ground and air attacks but was 
ineffective. Israel launched a well-planned and pre-rehearsed attack against Bekaa Valley 














Figure 20.   SA-7 MANPAD (left) and SA-6 (right) (From Military Analysis Network 
(d) 2006) 
 
The Syrians had not moved any of the SA-6 Gainful systems for over a 
year. Because of this error, Israel had learned the exact location of many of the elements 
of the SAM, radar, and communications infrastructure as well as their electronic 
fingerprints. Simulating the real attack profiles and radar signatures, remote piloted 
vehicles (RPV) flew on June 9th and fooled the Syrians into launches from their SAM 
sites. After the Syrians had reloaded their weapons, Israeli long-range artillery and rocket 
systems shelled these SAM sites, and soon after, aircraft came into play and launched 
AGM-45 Shrikes, AGM-78 Standard-ARMs, and AGM-65 Mavericks against the early 
warning and fire control radars. Pictures of these missiles can be seen in Figure 21. At the 
same time, the Israeli Air Force successfully employed jamming and chaff, denying the 
Syrian radar operators a picture of the air operation’s second wave, which destroyed 
many of the remaining air defense system elements. In only half an hour on June 9th, 19 
SA-6 sites were destroyed, the GCI system was heavily damaged, and air-to-ground and 





Figure 21.   Different Types of missiles Used During Arab-Israel Conflicts (From 
Military Analysis Network (d). 2006) 
 
 
d. The First Gulf War (Operation DESERT STORM)  
Electronic Warfare has been a necessary and oft-times effective 
component of air war since World War II. But in Desert Storm, only the 
stealth fighter ventured into enemy airspace unaccompanied by a swarm of 
supporting airplanes: some launching decoys to trigger enemy radar into 
action; some carrying anti-radiation missiles that instantly homed in as 
those radars came up. Stand-off jammers were out of range of enemy 
weapons but close enough to blank out enemy radios. It was a devastating 
combination of hard and soft kill, and it wrote a new chapter in the saga of 
warfare (Campen 1992, XIV). 
In the First Gulf War the importance of surprise and well-planned air 
attacks prior to the conduct of ground operations again proved to be decisive in the 
overall campaign. The strategy was simple: build enough coalition forces so that they 
could contain an Iraqi attack, then reduce the Iraqi ground forces’ effectiveness to fight 
by at least fifty percent through large-scale air attacks, and finally attack them with 
ground and air forces simultaneously (Browne and Thurbon 1998, 37). 
The Iraqi air defense system had 17,000 SAMs and 10,000 AAA and a 
wide variety of complex communications links (Watson 1993, 158). The Iraqi Air Force 
AGM-78 Standard ARM AGM-65 Maverick  
AGM-45 Shrike ARM 
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had 550 aircraft, of which a mix of obsolete Soviet Tu-16 and Tu-22 medium bombers, 
more modern Su-25 Frogfoot, a core of MiG-21, and a few long-range Su-24 fighter-
bombers fulfilled the ground attack role. For air defense the Iraqis used the MiG-23, 
MIG-25, and the MiG-29 aircraft. Iraq’s complex ground-air-defense system consisted of 
SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-8, and Roland missile batteries, supplemented by hand-held 
missile launchers (SA-7), and long- and short-range radar screening the border of Iraq 
and the city of Baghdad, where all communications were centered. Table 5 summarizes 
some of the assets that were used during the First Gulf War by the Coalition forces 




USAF RC-135  Extensive SIGINT (ELINT/COMINT) 
picture 
USAF U-2R Collection of COMINT 
RAF Nimrod R.2 ES purposes 
French DC-8 Sarigue,  
EC-160 Gabriel, SA330 Puma 
Helicopter 
ES purposes 
USAF EA-6B, F-4G Wild 
Weasel, EF-111A 
 Tornado, B-52, Jaguar, F-16,  
F-111, F-117A Nighthawk, A-10 
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US Magnum and Vortex ELINT  
KH-12 imaging satellites 
IMINT/ELINT purposes 
USAF EF-111A 
US Marine and Navy EA-6B 
Escort air strikes, provide jamming 
support to penetrate targets 
USAF EC-130H Compass Call Communications jamming, spoofing 
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US Navy Tomahawk Cruise missile (CM) for hard-kill 
missions 
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Emission Control (EMCON) Reduce the radiated energy that is 











US Army SINCGARS,  
USAF Have Quick radio 
Had integral EP capabilities 
 
Table 5. Assets Used For ES, EA and EP Purposes During the First Gulf War 
 
 
For the Coalition forces, the U.S. provided squadrons of F-14D and F-15C 
interceptors, F-16, F-117A Stealth Fighters, B-52 strategic bombers, F-4G Wild Weasels 
armed with HARMs, A-10 Warthog tank killers, and Hellfire-capable Apache and Super 
Cobra helicopters for tactical ground support. Other main aircraft were French Jaguars 
and British GR-1 and F-3 Tornados. Conventional-warhead Tomahawk cruise missiles 
(CM) were also extensively used, launched from the battleships Missouri and Wisconsin, 
along with other naval platforms (Watson 1995, 161–162). The Tomahawk is a cruise 
missile equipped with a small camera. It matches the video to preloaded maps onboard, 
enabling the missile to cruise over the terrain using reference points. 
For the first time, chips and computers played a significant role in warfare, 
delivering more information, intelligence, and fire power than ever seen before. A new 
kind of chaff developed by the U.S. was also deployed in the Gulf War. First tested in the 
Pacific Ocean near San Diego, this chaff, instead of falling harmlessly to sea as intended, 
was blown toward the land some 90 miles away and draped over electric power lines, 
shorting the transformers and causing blackouts in some parts of San Diego during its 
testing (Adams 1998, 37). Although Iraq’s leadership, communication and transportation 
systems, nuclear biological and chemical (NBC) warfare capabilities, and infrastructure 
and power supply networks were targeted, the first priority was to disrupt its command 
and control system and achieve ‘air superiority’.  
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Among the first priority targets were command posts, communication 
systems, airfields, air defense radars, operation centers, and the electrical generation and 
distribution networks (Browne and Thurbon 1998, 38). Similar to tactics used in the 
Bekaa Valley by Israel, the first breach was made against two radar stations near the 
border southwest of Baghdad by eight AH-64A attack helicopters, destroying them in 
two minutes. The air defense operations center in Nukheyb was destroyed by two F-
117As with GBU-27 2,000 pound laser-guided bombs. Immediately after those attacks, 
command and communications targets and elements of the electrical power network were 
demolished by F-117As and R/UGM-109C/D Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM 
C/Ds), without being detected by the Iraqi air defenses.  
During the next wave, the Iraqis thought they shot down a number of 
aircraft, but their celebration was short-lived because they had been decoyed by BQM-74 
drones and Tactical Air Launched Decoys (TALDs). BQM-74 was an unmanned jet-
powered aircraft. Although it was only thirteen feet long, it could project the radar image 
of a much larger airplane. “Moments behind the drones and TALDs were a mass of 
seventy allied aircraft armed with radar-killing HARM (U.S.) and ALARM (British) 
missiles whose purpose was to find and attack the Iraqi radar beams, then follow the path 
of the beam back to the radar stations and destroy them” (Adams 1998, 45). It was 
relatively simple for the F-4Gs to accomplish this mission provided that all the radar 
systems and anti-aircraft batteries were operating in an attempt to find incoming targets, 
which in fact were the drones causing them to believe a real air strike was in progress. 
These first waves of conventional strike aircraft used tactics similar to those in Vietnam, 
where they were protected by fighter cover and EW support. They were able to fly in 
clean air corridors and strike targets in Iraq.  
In the first Gulf War precision-guided munitions (PGMs) significantly 
increased the overall effectiveness of the air campaign, not only because of their accuracy 
and ability to destroy point targets, but also because of their relatively low percentage of 
collateral damage. The F-117A, which has a very low radar and infrared signature, was 
another contributing factor to the success of the air campaign. They were undetectable by 
the enemy radars. The loss rate for Coalition air forces was very low. This was partly due 
to the fact that the Coalition forces gathered accurate SIGINT on Iraqi air defense 
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systems, made great efforts to conduct defense suppression, utilized effective HARM and 
ALARM anti-radiation missiles, and employed well-developed EW systems in their 
aircraft, and well-trained crew to use these systems.  
The ground war that followed the air strikes was supported by two E-8A 
JSTARS (Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System), similar to the support that 
E-3 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) gave air strikes. E-8 JSTARS 
prevented Iraqi ground forces from moving safely and undetected across the desert day 
and night. One picture that is provided by JSTARS of the Iraqi retreat from Kuwait is 
presented in Figure 22. In his book The Next World War, James Adams comments on the 
AWACS and JSTARS: 
Overreaching the whole campaign was the web of information gathering 
and transmission that was as vital as aviation kerosene itself. E-3 AWACS 
(Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft, essentially a Boeing 707 
on top of which a large mushroom-like structure had been fixed to house a 
mass of electronic surveillance equipment, patrolled the skies above the 
Iraqi border. The AWACS were able to view the entire airspace of 
conflict…E-8 JSTARS aircraft, another version of Boeing 707, provided 
the same function as AWACS on behalf of ground forces, their role being 
to detect enemy activity such as convoys, tank formations, and Scud 
missile sites that the Iraqis had hidden in remote places (Adams 1998, 45). 
The AWACS acted as the eyes for the air forces, JSTARS did the same for 
the ground forces, and the RC-135s were the ears of the allied forces. The RC-135 
aircraft monitored and eavesdropped on Iraqi communications, and located and localized 
the source of any hostile electronic emissions. This data was then passed to Tactical Air 
Control Centers (TACC), where the TACC planned and directed attacks against these 
locations (Adams 1998, 46). 
Shortly after the ground war started, the Iraqis lost their will to fight. The 
ground war lasted just 100 hours with fewer than 500 Coalition casualties (Browne and 




Figure 22.   E-8 A JSTAR Moving Target Indication Picture of the Area of Kuwait City 
in Late February 1991. Each Dot Is A Vehicle or A Group Of Vehicles 
Heading North On The Roads As The Iraqi Forces Pulled Out Of Kuwait 
(From Browne And Thurbon 1998, 38) 
  
The Defense Satellite Communications Systems (DSCS) satellites were 
used extensively to provide vital communications links, supplementing an insufficient 
wire and microwave structure on the ground. The Global Positioning System (GPS) was 
one of the more important contributions provided by space-based systems. GPS provided 
the data for soldiers in every echelon to determine their location when other systems were 
insufficient. Special Forces made use of GPS in northeastern Iraq for targeting and 
destroying ground forces as well as Scud missiles (Adams 1998, 48). Infrared technology 
also played a significant role in air campaigns. Aircraft losses due to infrared SAMs were 
almost equal to the total of all other counter-measures. This shows that SAMs are big 
threats for aircrafts. In addition, the total loss of US aircraft due to Infra-Red (IR) SAMs 
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was actually more than the total loss of AAA and RF SAMs. This indicates the 
importance of IR-guided systems during the combat.  
The Gulf War was a real-life test of weapons, machines, and technology 
that had never been used in combat before. Many lessons related to the future of military 
operations may be drawn from Operation DESERT STORM. An obvious lesson is that 
the winner of the next major war will most likely control the electromagnetic spectrum 
and deploy small forces with greater combat power. The Gulf War initiated the use of 
Information Warfare, in which EW continues to play a major role. 
B. THE BIRTH AND THE EVOLUTION OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
1.  Historical Perspectives of Information Operations 
It is impossible to know what the first applications of what is now called 
information operations were, but some examples can be found in various studies. One of 
those sources is The First Information Warfare Web Site, which sets a timeline for IO that 
starts at 1200 BC with the Greeks’ use of the Trojan horse to gain entrance to Troy 
(Military Deception). Another source is the interview of Wanja Eric Naef by Professor 
Dan Kuehl, where Professor Dan Kuehl depicts an Assyrian King from 600 BC on the 
mountain with the “heaped-up skulls from his enemies” (Psychological Operations). 
According to Professor Dan Kuehl, this was a primitive type of information operations 
because the Assyrian King was actually trying to influence the enemies by the display of 
skulls, intimidating them with the message, “Don’t mess with Assyrians or you will lose 
your head.” Professor Kuehl is right, as the ultimate aim of IO is to influence the 
adversary’s decision-making processes in a manner favorable to friendly forces. This is 
exactly what the Assyrian King was trying to achieve.  
Though the history of IO is significant, it is not important when the first use of IO 
took place. The bottom line, as demonstrated by the examples above, is that IO and IW, 
while not known by these terms, have been around for a long time. They have become 
increasingly popular because of the increases in the number and availability of tools that 
can be used to employ them. Especially during the last quarter of the 20th century, the 
technologies available for information systems and communications made it easier to 
conceptualize and conduct IO as a discipline, and therefore, have led to much research, 
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development, and discussion in this area. To many combat experts, Operation Desert 
Storm is considered the first information war. 
2. The Evolution of the Term “Information Operations” 
Although the effort to gain information superiority goes back to very early dates 
in history, the theory that information could actually play a significant and even decisive 
role in the way warfare is conducted was first introduced by Dr. Thomas P. Rona in 1976. 
In his report titled “Weapons Systems and Information War,” Dr. Rona drew attention to 
the close and vital relationship between information and weapon effectiveness. Although 
he did not use the terms that are used today, he foresaw a system-of-systems, global 
grids, and network-centric warfare (NCW). The critical but ignored relationship between 
information systems and warfare platforms became clear in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 
(Campen and Dearth 2000, 289). Most of the critical thinking about IO began in the early 
1980s. Then, in Operation Desert Storm, Allied forces had information superiority and a 
modern weapons advantage over their adversary; therefore, they were able to end the war 
quickly and decisively. Despite the fact that the information infrastructure was not well-
planned and organized as contained in theory, this conflict taught that understanding the 
relationship between information and weapon systems, and possessing this superiority 
over the enemy, could be a decisive factor in the cost and result of a war. 
In 1992, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) published a classified 
document titled “Information Warfare.” Three months later, the Joint Chief of Staff 
issued an unclassified Memorandum of Policy 30 (MOP 30) titled “Command and 
Control Warfare (C2W)” which was broader than the OSD document. Being limited in 
scope and not compatible with service doctrines, the term C2W was changed to 
information operations (IO) by the Army and the Air Force. They claimed that the 
employment of information was also useful in peacekeeping and crisis management, and 
even in war it was not limited to Command and Control (C2) systems. 
In addition to these reasons, the Army and the Air Force also thought that 
information was a useful tool for federal, state, and local agencies (Campen and Dearth 
2000, 292). This idea is important because policy makers must use the military and 
diplomatic or civilian instruments together to be successful in peacekeeping operations 
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and crisis management. These two instruments should not be considered as separate 
entities because they intersect each other at many points during the conduct of IO.  
The critical relationship between information and weapon systems was strongly 
evident in examples such as the Gulf War, Bosnia, and Kosovo conflicts. Information 
Operations helped to shape the information space in all these conflicts. The ultimate goal 
of war is not to destroy everything, but to shape the behavior of the adversary in a 
favorable manner. Shaping the behavior of the enemy takes more than just managing the 
battlespace. We must also manage the information space. During wars in the past, like 
those in Kuwait and Kosovo, victory was attained in a conventional manner—Kuwait 
was freed and the Serbian army withdrew from Kosovo—but they did not secure the 
ultimate foreign policy objectives. The dictatorships in Iraq and Serbia remained in 
power after the termination of hostilities (Campen and Dearth 2000, 292). In order to 




Figure 23.     IO Capabilities and Related Activities (From Joint Publication 3-
51, I-5)  
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3. Differences between C2W, IW and IO 
According to Joint Publication 3-13, information operations (IO) are described as 
“the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations 
(CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and 
operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related 
capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated 
decision making while protecting our own” (Joint Publication 3-13, I-1). IO supporting 
capabilities are information assurance (IA), physical security, physical attack, counter-
intelligence (CI), and combat camera (COMCAM). IO related capabilities include public 
affairs (PA), civil military operations (CMO), and defense support to public diplomacy 





Computer Network Operations 
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SUPOORTING   
COMPETENCIES        
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Information Assurance Public Affairs 
Physical Security Civil Military Operations 
Physical Attack Defense Support to Public Diplomacy 
Counter-Intelligence  
Combat Camera  
 
Table 6.  Information Operations Competencies 
 
Information Warfare (IW) can be described as that part of information operations 
which is conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve specific objectives over an 
adversary. Although replaced by the terms IO and IW, Command and Control Warfare 
(C2W) is described in Joint Publication 3-13.1 as “the integrated use of psychological 
operations (PSYOP), military deception, operations security (OPSEC), electronic warfare 
(EW), and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information 
to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capabilities while protecting friendly C2 
capabilities against such actions” (Joint Publication 3-13.1, V). 
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From one perspective, information warfare is a wartime, or conflict, subdivision 
of IO. Although already superseded by the terms IO and IW, C2W is an application of 
IW in military operations that targets the enemy and protects friendly command and 
control capabilities and assets. That is why it can be considered as a subset of IW. But 
actually, employed C2W elements might create effects outside the command and control 
target set. They also differ in terms of the elements they use to accomplish their aim. IO 
employs broader assets and methods when compared with IW and C2W. These 
differences are depicted in Table 7. IW contains six elements: CNA, Deception, 
Destruction, EW, Operations Security, and PSYOP, while IO is much more 
comprehensive than IW, including supporting and related elements (Armistead 2004, 19). 
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Table 7.  Differences Between IO, IW, and C2W 
 
The most important features that distinguish the line between information 
operations and information warfare are as follows: 
• IO can be used to shape the pre-hostility environment so that conflict is 
possibly avoided. 





• IO includes thirteen elements. IW contains six, and C2W contains only 
five. 
• IO is a strategic campaign and much broader than IW. IO is conducted 
from peace to war and back to peace, as depicted in Figure 24. 
• In IO, not only enemy but also friendly forces are studied (Armistead 
2004, 20). The protection of friendly decision making process is as equally 





Figure 24.   Spectrum of Conduct of IO, IW, and C2W 
 
Even though they use different tools and are employed across a different time 
spectrum, the ultimate goal in all three kinds of warfare is achieving national objectives. 
The most important reason for the IO evolution from C2W and then from IW is the 
pursuit of the best means to accomplish this goal. Have the best tools to achieve the 
national objectives been discovered yet? Nobody knows for sure. What is certain is that 
people are always seeking the best tools to utilize, now and in the future, therefore IO 
should not be perceived as a solid, stable concept, instead it should be seen as an open 
ended, flexible tool which is ready to evolve and transform with future warfare 
requirements.  
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V. INTERACTION AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EW AND 
EACH IO COMPETENCY 
In this chapter, the interaction and relationship between electronic warfare, which 
is itself a core competency of information operations, and other IO core, supporting, and 
related competencies will be examined. Sometimes vague or indistinct, and sometimes 
direct or indirect, the relationship to electronic warfare is intrinsic due to the nature of IO. 
By definition information operations requires integration, coordination, and 
synchronization of core, related, and supporting competencies; therefore, the mutual 
relationship between the competencies is inevitable. As a matter of fact, the more 
communications and computing systems technologies rely on the use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum in the collection, storage, processing, and dissemination of 
information, the greater the interaction is of EW with the other competencies of IO. This 
shows the essential nature of the role that EW plays in IO. 
A. ELECTRONIC WARFARE INTERACTION WITH CORE 
COMPETENCIES 
 As we know, PSYOP, OPSEC, and MILDEC have played significant roles during 
the course of military history. But in the last century, and particularly in the second half, 
EW has joined with those capabilities and become one of the major competencies of 
warfare. This has been followed in recent years by the emergence of computer network 
operations as another combat competency. These five core competencies together, 
PSYOP, CNO, EW, MILDEC and OPSEC, are critical to shaping the information 
environment, influencing adversaries and target audiences (TA), as well as providing 
freedom of action in the realm of information (Joint Publication 3-13, II-1). Together, 
integrated and synchronized, they are the core competencies of IO. 
1. Computer Network Operations (CNO) and EW 
Computer network operations is a fairly new competency that has evolved over a 
few decades but has had a major impact on activities in the information environment. 
CNO has become an indispensable element of IO. The expanded use of wireless 
networking, digital computing and communication, along with the integration of 
computers with radio frequency (RF) communications equipment contribute to its 
significance in IO activities. This will weaken the distinction between EW and CNO 
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significantly, which will necessitate a case-by-case consideration of each operation in 
terms of the role of each competency (Joint Publication 3-13, I-5). It is a fact that the 
more integrated EW and CNO are, the easier the collection, manipulation, and 
dissemination of information. However, that integration creates more vulnerabilities than 
ever before, as it becomes more difficult to protect information. Computer network attack 
(CNA) and computer network defense (CND) might seem to have little relationship to 
EW at first, but they do interact. Their interaction is becoming more apparent and 
important, as there is an increase in reliance on the EM spectrum in the daily use of 
computer networks, particularly wireless networks. Dependence on the EM spectrum as a 
medium to exchange information and data that are to be processed by computers is 
increasing. As many computers are linked electronically, it is crucial to take into account 
EW planning aspects during the conduct of CNA and CND. This is due to the fact that 
physical access to a computer is often difficult, whereas electronic intrusion might be 
possible. This provides a better chance for enemies to attack wireless networks and 
exploit them (Joint Publication 3-51, IV-7). Electronic protection is as important as CND, 
as friendly computer networks must now be protected from both EA and CNA.  
Although EA may be used against computers, it does not necessarily mean that 
the activity would be classified as CNA. EW and CNA are different in that CNA is more 
focused on the data stream to execute the attack, while EA relies on the EM spectrum. 
For example, placing a virus or instructional code in a computer’s central processing unit 
(CPU) and causing it to fail is not an act of EA, but rather CNA. On the other hand, using 
an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to destroy or damage the delicate and unshielded 
circuitry of a CPU is an act of EA. Although they yield the same result, the way EA and 
CNA are applied is what separates their meaning (Joint Publication 3-51, GL-5).  
Targeting computer networks or infrastructure with EA capabilities like jamming, 
intrusion, or physical attack will greatly disable enemy computer networks and IT-
dependent systems. In the end, this slows down the decision-making process and leads 
adversary leaders to make incorrect or poor decisions. At the strategic and operational 
levels, it is important to have effective ES assets to locate, identify, and analyze such 
networks and technologies. EMP or virus bombs can be used to destroy or degrade the 
electronics of these computers and networks. Attacking computer networks is an effective 
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means to bringing down the economic sector and strength of a country during peacetime 
or conflict. CNO can be used to target not only military power, but also the other 
instruments of national power.  
CNA can be used to support electronic jamming by generating false alarms on 
enemy scopes; most modern radar systems use computer and IT technology in the 
processing of information. Processes might include, but are not limited to, detecting, 
locating, and identifying the enemy electronic order of battle (EOB) and sharing that 
information with necessary users. False alarms interjected by CNA would make it 
difficult to reach appropriate decisions about the location, situation, and intent of friendly 
forces. If the enemy fails to realize that they are being confronted with false alarms, this 
can cause the enemy to make incorrect decisions while believing they are correct. 
2. Military Deception (MILDEC) and EW 
In his book The Art of War, Sun-Tzu emphasizes the importance of deception by 
saying, “All warfare is based on deception.”(Sun Tzu 2002, 42) By definition, military 
deception is those “actions that are executed deliberately to mislead adversary military 
decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations thereby 
causing the adversary to take specific actions that will contribute to the accomplishment 
of the friendly mission” (Joint Publication 3-58, I-1). The purpose of MILDEC is to cause 
the adversary to take some specific actions that will contribute to the success of the 
friendly mission, or sometimes to cause inaction by the adversary It is clear that the 
purpose is not always to make the enemy act in a certain way as desired. At times, the 
goal is to keep the enemy inactive when they actually need to act. MILDEC and OPSEC 
complement each, and one is nearly always used with the other, so it is important to 
integrate these two core capabilities. For MILDEC to be effective it is important that the 
adversary decision makers perceive the information and data they obtained as correct and 
have full trust in their collection systems.  
The relationship between MILDEC and EW becomes obvious when the 
mechanisms of MILDEC—which include exploiting adversary information systems, 
processes, and capabilities—are recognized. That relationship is growing due to the fact 
that militaries are using the EM spectrum for deception purposes more frequently. As the 
enemy employs more infrared (IR), electro-optical (EO), and radio frequency (RF) 
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sensors, such as radar, radar warning receivers (RWR), remote sensing, and satellite 
imagery, friendly forces need to use the EM spectrum to counter them. This necessitates 
taking appropriate electronic protection measures to reduce vulnerability. 
In today’s information realm, causing adversary decision makers to believe what 
is not true is vital for gaining and maintaining information superiority. MILDEC seeks to 
mislead adversary decision makers by manipulating their perception of reality and 
causing them to act incorrectly, make incorrect decisions, or remain inactive when 
necessary. At the strategic level, intelligence about the adversary and reliable and correct 
target analysis becomes important for a successful MILDEC, initiated during peacetime. 
EW is a part of this MILDEC process, and is used to detect, locate, and identify targets, 
and then analyze their characteristics to direct suitable MILDEC measures accordingly. 
ISR capabilities are especially important to intelligence and target analysis. 
MILDEC can be used to influence an adversary causing them to underestimate 
EA, ES, and EP capabilities (Joint Publication 3-13, B-1). This can be accomplished 
through public affairs and civil affairs, as well as through a PSYOP campaign waged via 
open communication means such as the media, Internet, and television. An adversary 
may not take appropriate measures and precautions if they think they maintain 
information superiority; they will be disappointed once the conflict begins and they find 
they lack countermeasures because they underestimated friendly capabilities. 
EA and ES can be used for, or in support of, deception measures. EA and ES 
degrade adversary capabilities to detect, observe, report, process, and disseminate 
activities within and information about the friendly information environment. That, of 
course, causes the enemy to misinterpret information received by electronic means (Joint 
Publication 3-13, B-2). Nevertheless, a strategic deception campaign might fail to 
succeed if it loses credibility. It is necessary to balance the relationship between 
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Table 8. Military Deception Relations to Electronic Warfare 
 
MILDEC plans might limit EW, especially EA, capabilities in a way that limits 
the EA targeting of enemy information systems, so as to let them survive and continue 
their C2 functions (Joint Publication 3-13, B-5). Table 8 gives a summary of the 
relationship between EW and MILDEC. If everything related with information is denied 
to the adversary, then the adversary cannot be influenced to see, observe, report, and 
interpret information-related activities in the manner we desire. The electronic order of 
battle must be shaped to provide the enemy a false picture to act upon. EA capabilities 
like jamming, intrusion, and masking can not be used at all times for every target. 
Together with MILDEC planners, EW planners must coordinate and synchronize their 
efforts for the same purpose in terms of identifying which targets to apply EW to, what 
tools or platforms to use, when to employ EW, and how much EW to employ. Otherwise, 
it is highly probable that EW and MILDEC will conflict, degrading friendly capabilities 
and adversely impacting the mission.  
3. Operations Security (OPSEC) and EW 
Operations security is the process of identifying critical information and denying 
it to adversary decision makers to cause them to miscalculate the friendly forces, courses 
of action, and intentions. This leads the enemy to make incorrect decisions about the 
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situation (Joint Publication 3-13, II-3). Frequently, operations security complements a 
deception plan, and it is usually difficult to think of them separately. In the process of 
planning and executing MILDEC, the commander has to think about and integrate 
operations security. OPSEC is used to influence the adversary decision-making process 
through wrong, defective, or missing input. 
OPSEC has three phases: identifying the friendly actions observable by the 
adversary, determining which friendly indicators can be obtained by adversary 
intelligence capabilities, and selecting and executing ways to reduce or eliminate those 
indicators. Each EW subdivision relates to each of the three phases to some extent, as 
seen in Table 9. Operations security planners should know what kind of EM spectrum 
activities can be seen by the enemy through EA capabilities; EP is carried out to fill the 
gaps in vulnerabilities so that friendly actions are not revealed or disrupted by the enemy. 
The development of EP capabilities also depends on intelligence collection during 
peacetime. For this reason, strategic intelligence collection means, such as image 
intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), and signals 















Table 9. Relation of Electronic Warfare to Operations Security Process 
 
Military missions that can avoid detection by enemy radar usually prove to be 
more effective. Radar cross section (RCS) reduction, widely known as stealth technology, 
first became public in the early 1970s, and RCS reduction in ships, submarines, aircrafts, 
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), missiles, and ground vehicles took priority in the 
design of platforms (Jenn 2005, 1). Some of the platforms include, but are not limited to, 
the F-117A Nighthawk, B-2 Spirit, F-22 Raptor, Sea Shadow, USS Hopper, and DD(X). 








Figure 25.   F-117 A Nighthawk Stealth Platform (From Military Analysis Network(b) 
2006) 
 
The details of RCS reduction technology directly relate to OPSEC. By using 
stealth technology, many adversary ES capabilities become useless, because they are 
unable to detect the stealth or low-observable (LO) platforms low radiation emissions and 
low radar and IR signatures. At the same time, stealth platforms directly contribute to 
OPSEC by denying the enemy information about the platform—speed, location, 
direction, and other features. The US B-52 raids into Vietnam can be given as an 
appropriate example. In 1967, B-52 raids were being recognized by the Vietnamese early 
enough to endanger the raids. The problem in this case was not a classified information 
leakage. The enemy was cuing in on the unclassified flight plans of the B-52 crew in the 
international air traffic system. From that information, the North Vietnamese were able to 
estimate the raid entry times and the altitude. This is a great example of an OPSEC 
failure, emphasizing that not only classified data must be protected. Unclassified data 
might reveal the nature of operation as well. Related to this example, utilizing LO 
platforms can prevent the flight indicators from being compromised by the enemy. This is 
an example of the second process of OPSEC, determining what indicators hostile 
intelligence systems might obtain. 
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Figure 26.   Sea Shadow (left) and DD (X) Stealth Platforms (From MSN Encarta 
Webpage 2006) 
 
ES provides OPSEC with information about adversary capabilities and intentions 
to collect intelligence on essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) by means of 
the EM spectrum. In addition, electronic warfare support is used to augment the 
effectiveness of friendly emission control (EMCON) and information operations 
condition (INFOCON) measures and recommend modifications or improvements (Joint 
Publication 3-51, IV-5). The close coordination and frequent review of EEFI by the EW 
and OPSEC staffs is critical for adapting to a dynamic information environment. 
UAVs can be used to perform electronic masking missions for tactical ground 
troops, which create controlled radiation of electromagnetic emissions that will protect 
friendly frequencies and radiation from hostile ES assets. Doing so denies the enemy the 
ability to collect enough data for a decision. UAVs are also used as expendable, low-cost, 
and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) jamming and surveillance platforms. Dragon eye, 
RQ-1B Predator, and the BQM-74 Chukar are some examples of UAVs that can be used 
for these purposes. 
Physically attacking C4ISR systems and communication nodes with either hard 
EA means, like precision guided munitions (PGM), JDAM, or anti-radiation missiles 
(ARMs), or with soft means, like jamming and probing, contributes to OPSEC by 
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slowing down the OODA loop of the enemy, making it difficult for the enemy to collect 
and disseminate enough correct information to decide and act appropriately. 
Friendly systems and platforms can be evaluated with a series of operational and 
developmental tests to determine their vulnerabilities and assess their probability of being 
exploited by the enemy. To do that, available EA capabilities can play the red force and 
ES platforms can act as the blue force, in a kind of war game or operational exercise. EA 
assets attack ES platforms to find out ES vulnerabilities. At the same time employment of 
ES against these EA assets can also help determine the strength of ES systems and 
weaknesses of EA systems. EW hardening can help greatly to avoid unintended 
radiations and other undesirable effects of EM energy by filtering, attenuating, 
grounding, and shielding (Joint Publication 3-51, I-6).  
The training and awareness of EW personnel with regard to OPSEC measures 
play a critical role. EW personnel should understand that OPSEC, having no rule of 
thumb, is a significant process which applies differently to each situation, and that the 
EW personnel and platforms must be flexible and accommodating enough to respond 
effectively in various conditions. 
In a military deception campaign, electromagnetic deception and OPSEC must be 
integrated, synchronized, and coordinated in an appropriate fashion. Friendly indicators 
can be adjusted so that they convey incorrect data. It is important to make the adversary 
think the indicators are real, so that they will not continue to search for other 
corroborating data. OPSEC measures can conceal EW units and assets from IR and radar 
sensors, lasers, and EO systems of the enemy, degrading their ability to see, report, and 
process information. It is vital to apply EW and OPSEC in a way that they do not limit 
each other’s capabilities and do not interfere with each other’s objectives. 
4. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and EW 
Influencing the mind of the adversary must always be the ultimate objective of 
information operations. This is always most important than destroying troops and 
equipments. As long as the troops act in a manner that friendly decision makers desire, 
than it is easer to win the information superiority. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
PSYOP disseminates true, or seemingly true, information or indicators to ultimately 
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influence adversary organizations, groups, and individual behaviors. To accomplish this, 
motives, emotions, and perceptions of the target audience should first be understood. This 
very broad PSYOP mission can be employed through print media and radio as well as 
though more sophisticated means, such as the Internet, text messaging, and other media 
(Joint Publication 3-13, II-1). E-mail and Web sites may also be used to conduct PSYOP. 
Recent advancements in the areas of communications, electronics, digital signal 
processing, computer systems, and other information technologies, coupled with 
synergistic, net-centric application and execution, enable competencies like PSYOP and 
MILDEC to offer a greater number of improved capabilities (Joint Publication 3-13, I-3). 
This requires more involvement of EW in these areas.  
EW used to be involved only in the broadcasting portion of PSYOP; however, 
wide use of Internet and wireless networks have necessitated more EW coordination with 
PSYOP efforts. This is due to the fact that PSYOP, along with the other elements of IO, 
is increasing its dependency on the EM spectrum as a medium to get the message to the 
target audience. Today, even radio broadcasting of PSYOP themes in hostile territory can 
be considered more difficult than before, because EA capabilities like jamming, EM 
deception, electronic masking, and EM intrusion are widely known and used by many 
countries and can disrupt the transmission. Now it is easier than it used to be to have 
influence on individuals and thus have strategic impacts using PSYOP. This requires an 
improvement of the EA-PSYOP relationship. 
The actions necessary for the successful implementation of PSYOP include target 
analysis, reliable mediums or media for transmission, rapid exploitation of PSYOP 
themes, and continuous evaluation of results (Joint Publication 3-53, V). In almost every 





Figure 27.   PSYOP and EW Relationship 
 
At the strategic or theater-operational level, the EC-130E Rivet Rider/Commando 
Solo PSYOP aircraft can be used to provide PSYOP capabilities in support of allied or 
coalition forces (Joint Publication 3-13, VII-2). Their primary mission is PSYOP and 
they are capable of airborne broadcast of TV and radio signals. Commando Solo is able 
to conduct PSYOP and civil affairs (CA) broadcast missions in the standard AM, FM, 
HF, TV, and military communications bands. It is used in peacekeeping, peace making, 
and humanitarian assistance, all of which are important missions for today’s military. The 
EC-130E can also be used in the pre-hostile and peacetime environment where IO 
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Figure 28.   EC-130E Commando Solo PSYOP aircraft  (From Military Analysis 
Network (c) 2006) 
 
Operational exercises in which EW capabilities are prevalent and emphasized, 
along with the results of successful tests of new high-tech EW assets, would certainly 
help to give a target audience the idea that they are outmatched in any conflict and 
unlikely to win. This is a potential lash up between PSYOP and EW. 
Providing timely intelligence employing SIGINT (COMINT and ELINT) and ES, 
the military can collect new data or update existing information about the adversary. 
These ES reports can be used to assess the effects of past friendly PSYOP activities, 
although measures of effectiveness (MOE) are often difficult to establish (Joint 
Publication 3-13, II-5). ES indirectly helps to shape PSYOP campaigns specific to a 
particular area of responsibility or theater. It also helps to conduct target analysis and 
identifies what kind of desired messages are used by the enemy PSYOP authorities 
through electronic interception, assisting with counter-propaganda. Those activities might 
be used to construct new themes or update the existing ones. 
At the operational level, enemy radar sites, radar-aided weapon systems, and 
C4ISR systems can be targeted to break the bi-directional communication between 
commanders and troops, as well as to destroy and degrade EW capabilities. Destroyed 
and degraded C4ISR systems will increase psychological operations impacts and slow 
down the adversary decision making process. Targeting of these systems might be done 
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by jamming C4ISR systems electronically, using platforms like the EA-6B Prowler. 
C4ISR systems could also be destroyed using Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) or 
precision guided munitions (PGM), likewise denying the enemy the opportunity to 
reassure troops and forward deployed commanders to counter friend PSYOP messages. 
Figure 29 shows a PGM hitting its target. All of these types of activities create chaos and 
loss of control among units, individuals, and leaders, which will eventually degrade the 
adversary’s motives, emotions, and perceptions.  
 
Figure 29.   A PGM hitting its target (From Wikipedia Encyclopedia 2006) 
 
EW helps PSYOP by degrading the enemy’s ability to observe the activities in 
theater, report those activities, and make decisions accordingly. That helps to isolate the 
target audience from information sources (Joint Publication 3-13, B-2). Directed Energy 
Weapons (DEW), High Powered Microwave (HPM), and Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) 
technologies might create better results in affecting the citizens of the adversary’s country 
psychologically while minimizing collateral damage. This decreases the adversary’s 
motivation and will to fight for a cause and plants doubts about decision makers and 
leaders because of their incorrect and costly decisions.  
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Rivet Joint is the Air Force's primary airborne reconnaissance platform providing 
data to theater commanders and national command authorities. The data collected is 
essential for effective PSYOP operations as it helps to complete the electronic order of 
battle (EOB).  
At the tactical level, broadcasting PSYOP products on adversary frequencies is an 
example of the mutual relationship between EW and PSYOP (Joint Publication 3-13, B-
1). To accomplish this, ES assets first need to identify which frequencies are being used 
by the enemy. Then, considering friendly EA capabilities, it can be determined which of 
these frequencies to jam electronically. ES capabilities also help to identify how the 
enemy will try to degrade, disrupt, or disable our PSYOP capabilities though their own 
EA assets. 
If frequency spectrum management is not done properly, then it is possible for 
PSYOP broadcasts to conflict with EA efforts (Joint Publication 3-13, B-5).The 
frequencies used for PSYOP must not conflict with those used for other purposes. This is 
ensured through the preparation of the joint restricted frequency list (JRFL), which 
includes taboo, guarded and protected frequencies. 
The EC-130H Compass Call can be used when conducting joint PSYOP (Joint 
Publication 3-13, V-9). Electronic warfare—EA, suppression of enemy air defenses, and 
offensive counter information—is amongst the primary missions of that aircraft. 
Electronic deception used as an integral part of an overall deception campaign helps 
PSYOP messages to be more trustworthy and seemingly true. It reinforces the enemy’s 
misperception of the battlefield, assists in the deception campaign, and magnifies the 
image of friendly power in the eyes of the enemy.  
B. HOW DO THE SUPPORTING COMPETENCIES SYNCHRONIZE WITH 
EW? 
The supporting competencies of IO are physical security, physical attack, counter-
intelligence (CI), information assurance (IA), and combat camera (COMCAM). These 
five capabilities are depicted in Figure 30. They directly or indirectly contribute to the 




Figure 30.    IO Supporting Competencies 
 
 
1. Physical Security and EW 
Physical security is a part of overall security precautions. It is concerned with 
physical measures for the purpose of safeguarding personnel and preventing unauthorized 
access to equipment, installations, materials, and documents. Physical security also 
safeguards all of these from espionage, damage, theft, etc. It also includes determining 
the vulnerabilities of friendly equipment, installations, and other elements to known 
hostile activities and systems. It differs from information assurance in that IA ensures that 
information and information systems are protected while physical security guards the  
installations and sites that possess information and information systems (Joint Publication 
3-13, II-6). Protection of the information systems or any related construction is a part of 
physical security.  
Use of a jamming device for military convoys traveling in Iraq can be considered 
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friendly forces, safeguarding personnel and vehicles during troop movement. This is an 
example of active electronic protection using electronic attack for physical security 
purposes. 
Even during peacetime, in almost every facility and installation, the presence of 
thermal imaging devices, surveillance cameras, and other security measures, in addition 
to security personnel, are used to ensure adequate levels of physical security. These 
systems and personnel must be integrated via communications into a command and 
control system. EP is designed into such a system to safeguard communications from 
enemy interference, jamming, and intrusion (Joint Publication 3-13, B-2). EP measures 
also degrade the effectiveness of enemy intelligence collection capabilities and deny 
terrorists, criminals, and unconventional forces access to sensitive communications in 
these facilities during conflict and peace. 
Physical security sometimes requires the destruction of EW equipment, 
documents, assets, and platforms to avoid capture by the enemy. Such capabilities are 
designed into critical equipment with clearly understood instructions. For example a 
Special Forces team of five is ambushed by the enemy and the team possesses a combat 
radio that operates using national codes and a cryptographic algorithm. In this particular 
situation, the team has to physically destroy the radio to not reveal secret cryptology to 
the enemy and burn any paper or document relating to codes that are used for 
communication purposes. 
Physical security measures are used wherever EW equipment is present. This 
ensures the availability, survivability, and operability of the systems or equipment (Joint 
Publication 3-13, B-3). Physical security is critical to the protection of radar sites, C4ISR 
assets, links, nodes, equipment, and the personnel that support them. Establishing 
personnel access rules for EW buildings, sites, equipment, and informational or 
instructional documents; utilizing access control devices, such as ID cards and badges; 
and placing entry security guards all help to safeguard sensitive materials.  
Covering and camouflaging radar sites against enemy sensors, satellite imaging, 
and ISR is another way in which physical security contributes to EW. Other physical 
security measures include, but are not limited to, fencing and perimeter stand-off, lighting 
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and sensors, vehicle barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection systems and electronic 
surveillance, and access control devices and systems. Figure 31 shows some of the 
examples of physical security measures. Those measures should be overlapping and 
deployed in depth to enable multiple controls to fill security gaps (Joint Publication 3-57, 
VII-15). With current technology, such as retinal and iris recognition, finger print 
recognition, voice recognition, and face scanners, access control has improved. 
 
 
Figure 31.   Examples of Physical Security Measures of EW Sites and Installations 
 
 
2. Physical Attack (Hard Kill) and EW  
Some references use the term “physical destruction” instead of physical attack. 
The two are synonymous. They can also be referred to as hard-kill capabilities. Physical 
attack disrupts, destroys, or damages targets of any kind using kinetic destructive power; 
it might also be used to change the adversary’s perception of the situation in a manner 
favorable to friendly forces. Physical attack is not done when IO fails; nevertheless, it 
supports IO. Remember that IO is concerned with the ultimate objective, rather than with 
the manner in which forces reach that objective. Physical attack is an area that militaries 





comes to the mind of the commander when evaluating IO alternatives. It is true that while 
at first it seems easier to apply physical attack and observe concrete results, in many 
circumstances it can be less efficient than the application of an appropriate element of IO.    
Physical attack provides an effective means of attacking adversary C2 nodes, 
links, communication systems, radar sites, and other portions of the EW and 
communications infrastructures. The destruction of those targets ultimately seeks to 
influence the targeted audience (Joint Publication 3-13, II-7).Physical attack can also 
accomplish the physical destruction of adversary EW systems and therefore support 
friendly EW operations superiority. As a cautionary note, in destroying enemy emitters, if 
not well planned, physical attack can limit friendly ES capabilities to employ intrusion or 
transmission analysis on the targets (Joint Publication 3-13, B-5). 
Precision strike with PGMs is an important element of physical attack. Frequency 
deconfliction and frequency management are vital to such attacks because many weapon 
systems rely on the EM spectrum to accomplish their missions. ES platforms dynamically 
map the EM environment for targeting and target avoidance. EA carries out an important 
role in defeating enemy air strikes and also countering enemy PGMs. Radar and IR 
guided missiles; man portable air defense systems (MANPADs) (see Figure 32); 
Tomahawk; ARM; and HARM are some of the major systems and weapons used in 
destruction (Joint Publication 3-13, IV-6). HARM and ARM weapons must be 











Figure 32.   Infrared Guided MANPADs Are Used for Air Defense (From Radar War 
Website 2006) 
 
In addition to the systems mentioned, directed energy weapons (DEW) are 
gaining importance in terms of carrying out the destruction mission. Some other means to 
attack are airborne PGM; JDAM; cruise missiles (CM); intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM); RF-, IR-, or EO-aided artillery; and expendable UAVs with explosive payloads. 
The first two days of the First Gulf War are an example of effective suppression 
of enemy air defenses (SEAD) including destruction by physical attack. This was 
discussed in the historical perspective chapter. Iraqis were denied the use of most of their 
intelligence collection, communications and command and control capabilities, which 
enabled coalition forces to prevail in the information environment and to gain 
information superiority. 
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Figure 33.   AWACS As an Example of EW In Support of Physical Attack Means (From 
Air Force Technology Website 2006) 
 
ES and SIGINT help to locate, classify, and prioritize targets for physical attack. 
This shortens the targeting cycle. Emission control (EMCON) and ES are important in 
protecting friendly assets from enemy PGMs. ES provides enough time to react against 
such attacks and disable the electronics of the missiles. ES also provides feedback on the 
results of physical attack by analyzing the communications and emissions traffic and 
density. In other words, ES makes an electronic battle damage assessment (BDA) through 
the use of SIGINT and ES capabilities (Joint Publication 3-51, IV-7 ).AWACS, (see 
Figure 33 above) JSTARS; and U-2 are some examples of ES capabilities appropriate for 
such SIGINT missions. 
GPS uses satellite signals to determine position, velocity, and direction. GPS and 
precision navigation and positioning (PNP) give modern weapon systems the ability to 
precisely attack selected targets, which minimizes collateral damage. GPS and PNP 
contribute to the effectiveness of targeting and munitions control, as well as reduce the 
number of sorties required to destroy or degrade a target (Air Force Doctrine Document 
2-5, 34). It is important to emphasize that collateral damage can be used as a propaganda 
asset by the adversary to increase the will of the populace to fight and to reduce friendly 
PSYOP influence over them. Such propaganda might have lasting effects beyond the 
current conflict. 
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3. Counter Intelligence (CI) and EW 
CI is comprised of collected information and activities performed to counter 
adversary intelligence, espionage, sabotage, assassinations, etc. Only careful coordination 
of CI with OPSEC, physical security, and IA ensures the protection of information and 
information systems (Joint Publication 3-13, II-7).  
CI supports EP and ES by providing electronic countermeasures (Joint 
Publication 3-13, B-3). EP and ES assets must be allocated appropriately to ensure 
accomplishment of both EW and CI activities. EW means can be used to destroy or 
degrade enemy intelligence capabilities. Electronic masking of activities in the EM 
spectrum, electronic deception of enemy intelligence sensors, electromagnetic hardening, 
and EMCON and electronics security are all potential counter-intelligence activities. ES 
measures can help to search for, intercept, classify, and localize potential hostile emitters 
(Joint Publication 3-51, I-8). Some EW and communications platforms may be used to 
rapidly disseminate collected enemy data and intelligence to assist in timely and accurate 
CI activities. To be able to accomplish this, friendly EP must be capable of operating in 
the adversary electronic attack and electronic warfare support environment.  
Electronic intelligence collected through SIGINT and ES capabilities is used to 
evaluate, analyze, and update enemy intelligence capabilities. This helps to reorganize 
and update friendly CI activities and direct them to the appropriate enemy capability. 
4. Combat Camera (COMCAM) and EW 
The mission of COMCAM is to provide leaders, commanders, and decision 
makers at all levels with imagery to support operational and planning requirements (Joint 
Publication 3-13, II-7). The acquisition and utilization of imagery can be still or motion, 
and can be used in support of combat, information, humanitarian assistance, special force, 
ISR, engineering, legal, public affairs, and other operations involving the Military 
Services (Joint Publication 1-02, 97). 
ES capabilities that support intelligence also contribute to the COMCAM mission 
across the spectrum of conflict. Motion and still imagery can be used to locate, identify, 
and analyze radar installations, surface-to-air-missiles, and other potential EW targets.  
92 
COMCAM can be used to assess the effectiveness of EW hard or soft targeting by 
providing imagery of targets as a form of battle damage assessment (BDA). EP 
contributes to the COMCAM mission by enabling safe transmission of COMCAM 
imagery. 
5. Information Assurance (IA) and EW 
IA is composed of measures that protect and defend information and information 
systems. These measures provide and ensure the availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation of information and information systems. IA is an 
indispensable element to gaining information superiority. IA relates to EW in that EW 
provides operational protection against adversary and intelligence efforts that target 
friendly electronic information and information systems (Joint Publication 3-13, II-6). IA 
is concerned with information itself—whether it resides in a computer, network, cable, or 
is radiated via the electromagnetic environment. Reliance on computers and IT to 
conduct EW increases the challenge to pursue effective IA. IA is one of the competencies 
insuring EW assets are readily available and accessible (Joint Publication 3-13, B-2). 
Incorporating the compatibility, interoperability, survivability, and supportability of EW 
assets and platform designs ensures an effective and affordable level of information 
assurance activities  
On the other hand, EW supports IA through EP by protecting the information, 
information systems, and assets (Joint Publication 3-13, B-3). Controls and measures, 
such as communications security (COMSEC) and emission control (EMCON), can be 
used to deny the unauthorized user access to EW or information systems. This provides 
telecommunications authenticity and prevents the unauthorized user from deriving 
intelligence using telecommunications means. Activities such as cryptology, transmission 
security, emission security, and physical security of communications and EW assets and 
information can be considered IA. Password authentication and encryption methods are 
possible ways to deny unauthorized user access. EW personnel should be well-educated 
about the importance of IA in protecting assets from hostile activities. 
C. THE PA, CMO, AND DSPD RELATIONSHIP TO EW 
The IO related competencies are public affairs (PA), civil military operations 
(CMO), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD), as shown in Figure 34. These 
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capabilities, while related to and requiring coordination with IO, are distinct and must not 
be compromised by IO activities (Joint Publication 3-13, II-8). The relationships between 
EW and these supporting competencies are ambiguous and indirect for the most part. 
 
Figure 34.   Information Operations Related Competencies  
 
Public Affairs (PA) is defined as “public information, command information, and 
community relations activities applied to internal or external audiences” (Joint 
Publication 3-13, II-8). ES and EP capabilities that enable communications between PA 
authorities and their audiences support PA. ES, EP, and necessary physical security 
measures help ensure continuous media coverage and prevent physically and 
electronically unauthorized access to the equipment and sites used for PA purposes. 
Around-the-clock availability of live and broadband broadcasting ensures that PA 
activities can be performed at any time they are needed. 
News media can be used to support EW activities in the accomplishment of 
military objectives. For instance, through news media, integrated EW exploitation during 
joint exercises can be emphasized, successful missile interception tests and exercises can 


















headlines that ultimately influence decision makers and convey an image of the friendly 
forces’ strength. In addition, using the PA medium, DEW, and high-power microwaves 
(HPM) can be advertised, and it can be explained that collateral damage is minimized and 
civilian casualties are reduced by pinpointing only military targets. 
It is important to deconflict PA and EW so that they do not interfere with each 
other and they do not limit the accomplishment of their separate objectives. In this sense, 
electronic warfare support can help locate, identify, and then analyze the adversary 
communications mediums appropriately and then set the suitable PA channels. For 
example, it is no use to use television as a public affairs medium if the targeted audience 
does not have a television to watch. 
Defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) includes measures and activities 
taken by DOD components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts. DSPD 
seeks to inform, influence, and broaden the dialogue between U.S. and foreign countries 
(Joint Publication 3-13, II-10). COMCAM activities that involve EW activities can also 
be used in DSPD to provide responsive imagery coverage (Joint Publication 3-13, B-9). 
Like public affairs (PA), DSPD can be used to show friendly EW capabilities—
electronic support (ES), electronic protection (EP), and electronic attack (EA)—and can 
cause the adversary to lose the will to fight. EP and ES protect the medium by which the 
DSPD message is conveyed from adversary EA capabilities. Aircraft such as Commando 
Solo can also be used for DSPD purposes. EP and EA can be used to protect diplomats 
and political figures when they are in a war zone or in hostile territory from physical 
attack or communications intelligence by the adversary.  
Civil military operations (CMO) are the activities of the commander that 
establish, develop, and sustain positive relations between governmental institutions, non-
governmental organizations (NGO), civilian authorities, civilian populace, and military 
forces (Joint Publication 3-13, II-8-9). 
The establishment of a training and exchange program for EW equipment and 
systems improves the relationship between friendly forces and their allies during post-
conflict reconstruction. Operators, EW staff, and engineers of allied nations can all 
receive valuable training with each other’s help. To sustain positive relations, allies can 
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equip each other with personnel and systems when confronting a shared enemy. For 
example, friendly forces can donate early warning radars or air-defense artillery weapons 
to each other and train operators for each other’s systems. 
EP helps to protect the frequencies used for CMO purposes. This frequency 
spectrum management ensures the availability of communication mediums for CMO 
purposes. In crises or post-war environments, allies can help to reestablish local and 
governmental agencies and restore command and control functions. By focusing on 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND IO-EW CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
TURKEY 
This chapter discusses IO and EW considerations for the nation of Turkey. The 
ideas in this chapter represent the author’s personal opinions and are derived as a result of 
his pursuit of a Master’s Degree at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, 
California, and his comprehensive research on behalf of this thesis. None of these 
conclusions are to be construed as scientifically proven analyses. They reflect the 
author’s application of his knowledge and thoughts about the areas of IO and EW gained 
during his studies at NPS, applied to the specific environment of Turkey. The 
considerations presented in this chapter are grouped into areas of personnel, training and 
execution, and technology. 
A. IO CONSIDERATIONS FOR TURKEY 
It is largely acknowledged that the world is living in an “information age” in 
which achieving information dominance and decision superiority has become 
increasingly important. Information Operations (IO) is proving to be a useful tool for 
nations to employ. This applies to Turkey in much the same way as it does the United 
States. 
After the Cold War, Turkey emerged as one of the most powerful and influential 
nations in its region. As a long-standing NATO member and strategic partner of the 
United States, Turkey has been involved in numerous regional and strategic crises and 
conflicts, including but not limited to Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, and lately a commanding 
role in Afghanistan. 
Today, small unit and special force operations have gained great importance. 
Operations in the modern day have transformed from being human-centric to technology-
centric, which enables nations to reach their objectives using small but technologically 
advanced units rather than brute force or overwhelming power. These modern realities 
emphasize the importance of IO for Turkey; therefore, Turkey has adapted IO concepts to 
its own particular situation and has begun evaluating the application of IO for both 
civilian and military purposes.  
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Personnel 
Implementing IO requires that different personnel and organizations play their 
roles in an orchestrated manner. The actors are not only the military, but also political 
leaders, government agencies, and civilian organizations—any individual, organization, 
or agency that might influence the decision-making process. Therefore, maintaining 
enough expert personnel with the proper qualifications is important to implementing and 
sustaining the power of IO. 
 From time to time, IO might impose organizational changes to government 
agencies and the Armed Forces in order to promote and facilitate coordination and 
integration. Therefore, Turkey might always be in need of some organizational changes. 
In a constantly changing, information-dominated world, the status quo is likely to lead to 
stagnation. Such changes and their impact on the overall effectiveness of national power 
must be carefully evaluated before they are applied. Turkey will benefit by continuing 
careful analysis of the integration of IO into the organizational structures of other nations. 
It is important that Turkey investigates the difficulties other nations encounter and applies 
IO in a manner that appreciates the unique nature of its own structures. 
IO contains broad areas of application that include soft-kill and hard-kill aspects. 
Older conventional warfare capabilities that are a part of IO, such as MILDEC and 
PSYOP, and the newer sophisticated technologies, such as EW and CNO, must go hand-
in-hand within IO. To best and most efficiently conduct synchronized IO, there must be a 
requisite number of experts in each of these areas or “capabilities” of IO. Only after this 
requisite number of experts is gathered can IO be applied appropriately. Therefore, 
personnel recruiting, education, and allocation become crucial and must be continually 
monitored. 
All civilian and military personnel involved in decision-making processes must 
have sufficient knowledge of IA, OPSEC, physical security, and CI competencies, 




Training and Execution 
To be better prepared for the conflicts of the future and the uneasy peace between 
them, Turkey would benefit from closely monitoring IO research and related 
developments around the globe. Turkey must especially consider continuing to 
participate with its friends and allies in these areas and continue to make efforts in 
training its government and military personnel in the areas of IO. 
The current emphasis on training individuals in IO should continue. Training 
becomes more efficient if it is given to individuals and groups at every level of hierarchy 
and occupation in a balanced manner. This balanced approach can increase IO 
effectiveness because strategic and operational IO planners and decision makers can 
better evaluate situations, and in turn guide tactical planners and commanders more 
effectively.  Likewise, tactical IO decision makers can better understand what is 
demanded by their superiors and implement results with more accuracy. Such training 
can be conducted via seminars, briefings, military exercises, and lectures, adjusted to the 
specific needs of each group.  
One of the strengths of IO is that it can be implemented by a country that does not 
have the ability to adopt exotic and sophisticated IO technologies, such as those common 
in the capabilities of EW, CNO, and advanced physical attack. IO can transform the 
combat and diplomatic power of a nation by weighing each competency according to the 
specific capability of that nation against those competencies of an adversary. This 
transformation extends its applicability and power across the full spectrum of peacetime, 
crisis, war, and post-war periods. Turkey can benefit from the power of IO by using it 
flexibly to conduct humanitarian assistance missions, United Nations missions, NATO 
duties, civil military activities, refugee relocation assistance missions, and diplomatic 
processes. 
Information Operations blurs the lines separating strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels of warfare. In a world of rapid communications that is inundated with 
information, tactical mistakes may result in operational or strategic failures. Also, 
problems and difficulties encountered during IO planning phases may impact execution 
at all three levels of warfare. IO blends these three levels of warfare and the decision-
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making processes that support them and tie them together. Coordination between these 
levels of command and control is critical.  It is important to increase the frequency of the 
meetings (electronic or physical) where strategic decision makers meet with operational 
and tactical commanders and their staffs. These meetings are necessary because IO issues 
can be addressed and coordinated, and potential solutions to the various issues that cross 
the levels of command can be derived. 
By itself, there is no IO. IO is not a separate force or activity. As long as people 
live in a world hungry for information, it is unlikely that the importance of IO will lessen. 
Therefore, it is important for Turkey to continue to maintain its IO perspective, 
recognizing it is inherent to all military and civilian activities, but not as a separate force.  
Turkish Republic has always followed the guidance of its founder, Mustafa 
Kemal ATATURK, who said, “Peace at home, peace in the world.” Despite its strategic 
geographic location, Turkey has not been directly involved in any conflict over the last 
three decades, excluding the struggle against terrorism. Major conflicts in the second half 
of the 20th century through the present have occurred in close proximity to Turkey. Some 
of them are the Second World War, the Afghanistan-Russia War, Arab-Israeli Wars, and 
the First and Second Gulf Wars. Due to its close proximity, Turkey has been indirectly 
involved and impacted by these conflicts to some extent. At times, Turkey has granted 
basing privileges for combat aircraft operating out of its territory. During and after 
conflicts, refugees flooding across Turkey’s borders from neighboring countries have 
been accommodated. Some consequences cannot be dealt with easily or solely through 
conventional warfare strategies. IO is a good tool to be utilized in these instances. Turkey 
can utilize the competencies of PSYOP, defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD), 
CMO, PA, and combat camera (COMCAM). These competencies can be used to exploit 
the situation in Turkey’s interest and to deter potential negative consequences. IO can 
help to establish and maintain good relationships with neighboring countries and remote 
friends and allies.  
Turkey incorporated IO into its doctrine and training quickly and has lately 
published the MT 411-1 and MT 145-1 Field Manuals. These have contributed to the 
understanding of IO concepts. It might be helpful for Turkey to investigate the new 
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insights on IO that are included in the recently released document Joint Publication 3-13 
“Information Operations (13 February 2006)” and “Information Operations Roadmap”, 
which are currently the leading IO joint publications for the United States military. There 
are changes in the categorization of IO competencies incorporated in the IO spectrum. It 
can be analyzed carefully for the particular needs of Turkey and then adapted as 
necessary. 
Turkey has successfully established close relationships between universities, 
civilian organization, military agencies, and governmental agencies. The interest in 
improving these relationships in positive and scientific ways is crucial for success, as the 
number of actors involved in the decision-making process has increased along with the 
complexity of this process. The methods for handling this complexity and for achieving 
information dominance involve a thorough understanding of IO and careful 
implementation of it through coordination, synchronization, and integration of all of the 
different competencies, focused on the common national objectives. 
IO requires different types of training, each of which is equally important. Some 
training is specific and extensive, such as the education of personnel in areas of CNO and 
EW. This is due to the high level of technological expertise that is required.  Such 
training is often of a classified nature. Other types of training are not highly technical and 
have a broad application to all personnel. These areas include OPSEC, IA, and physical 
security. It is vital for success in IO that all personnel involved in decision-making 
processes receive this broader training. 
Turkey has been combating terrorists for more than quarter of a century and still 
faces a significant terrorist threat. Turkey has made great advances in countering terrorist 
activities, yet there is still much to be done. IO can assist in increasing the efficiency of 
the country’s capability to protect its citizens and resources from destructive and 
separatist terrorist activities. IO manages resources in a productive way through 
coordination and integration. The capabilities of civil military operations (CMO), 
psychological operations (PSYOP), and EW are synchronized under IO, increasing the 
efficiency of governmental intelligence collection and police activities. 
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The increasing impact of public affairs (PA), the power of the media, and the 
Internet should all be given special interest. Public affairs and the media have become 
more important than ever because it is increasingly easier and cheaper to gain access to 
them. They are used or manipulated by countries, civilian organizations, and terrorists to 
constantly shape the information environment in their favor. These tools are powerful 
because the probability of conveying messages to the targeted audience is high, access to 
them is easily obtained, and they do not require a high level of expertise to use. Turkey 
should continue implementing these tools in the best manner to eliminate or counter 
adversary messages conveyed through PA, media, and the Internet. These tools can be 
used to convey official Turkish messages to the targeted audience. It must be 
remembered that PA and power of media can be enough to show a success as a failure 
and a failure as a success. 
Technology 
Technology that is used in the IO competencies, particularly in CNO, EW, and 
physical attack, is changing rapidly. Old technology is quickly becoming obsolete. 
Technology that is obsolete and inferior to the technology of the adversary may not be 
able to accomplish the mission. This is very important in terms of acquisition programs 
of both military and governmental agencies.  
Special interest should be given to the computer network operations (CNO) 
competency of IO. This competency is comprised of rapidly changing information 
technologies (IT), creating exploitable opportunities and critical vulnerabilities at the 
same time. IT is becoming inherent in every technological area; it resides in each and 
every competency, which makes them vulnerable to computer-related hostile activities. 
Although it imposes vulnerabilities upon the other IO competencies, it is a fact that, if 
used appropriately, CNO greatly contributes to the effectiveness of that particular 
competency. This is also true for Turkey. 
B. EW CONSIDERATIONS FOR TURKEY 
Turkey has long realized the importance and effectiveness of EW and utilized it to 
counter terrorist activities within its borders. There is a direct correlation between EW  
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and success in counter-terrorism. EW is also important for Turkey as a force multiplier. 
Any future crisis that Turkey might get involved in is likely to have an intensified EW 
dimension. 
EW requires the most recent technology, and this technological edge must be held 
over potential adversaries. The importance of EW must continue to be emphasized and 
close cooperation between national industry and military and governmental research 
organizations should continue. 
Personnel 
A balanced approach to personnel recruiting and training in all three subdivisions 
of EA, EP, and ES is always necessary. These three subdivisions are similar to the three 
legs of stool—if they are not balanced, then they will not provide the necessary support.  
The increased use of computers in EW systems and platforms and the 
minimization of human interface in most of these systems provide an emphasis on 
software creation and reprogramming. These two areas have very unique roles in modern 
EW, and it is essential that Turkey maintain emphasizing them. Having requisite software 
personnel working in EW assets and systems development is critical. 
EW has already necessitated some organizational changes in Turkey concerning 
the use of EW units and resources and their partitioning between the services. It is likely 
that the continuously changing technology of EW will require additional organizational 
changes in the future. If executed carefully, those changes can increase the effectiveness 
and efficiency of EW activities and its overall contribution to the other IO competencies. 
It is critical that Turkey always stays abreast of the latest changes in the 
technologies within electronic warfare subdivisions and develop the necessary technical 
infrastructure to adapt to these changes. Engineer or expert exchange programs and 
participation of EW-related personnel in bi-lateral or multi-national military exercises are 





Training and Execution 
As EW is becoming more intrinsic within military and civilian activities, the 
training and education of EW must continue to emphasize future needs for using the 
electromagnetic environment. 
Every country classifies EW-related doctrine, documents, technologies, and 
tactics. Hence it is often difficult to obtain this kind of information directly from the 
source. This aspect adds an even more complicated dimension to the difficulty in 
obtaining access to technological development and changes. That is why having the 
capability to develop EW technology and assets become more crucial for success. While 
taking appropriate precautions, such as complying with information assurance and 
physical security measures, Turkey has to continue development in EW. 
The employment and capabilities of the same EW assets differs from environment 
to environment. For example, maritime environment search and detection radar does not 
have the same specifications as air defense search and detection radar. Similarly, the 
mountainous regions of Turkey are a limiting factor to the employment of EW. In these 
regions, line of sight (LOS) is limited, the transportation and movement of the systems 
are difficult, and seasonal conditions are extreme; very hot in the summer and very cold 
in the winter.  In every system developed domestically or acquired from foreign 
countries, it is vital that Turkey continue giving special consideration to their utilization 
throughout these geographic regions. 
Having confronted terrorist activities for more than a quarter of a century within 
its own borders, Turkey has gained experience on how to counter terrorism. EW has 
proven its potential in combating terrorist activities. This has encouraged deeper research 
and development in this area. EW-related terrorist threats are increasingly common. 
Terrorists can obtain commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies cheaply and easily, 
using them to improvise weapons. One example is the increased use of improvised 
explosive devices (IED) and remotely detonated road mines and bombs. In 2006 Turkey 
has experienced an increase in the use of IEDs and remotely detonated road mines (cell-
phones are usually used for detonation). This shows that terrorists are also increasing 
their technological expertise. EW can be used to counter these types of weapons; one 
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example can be use of jammers with convoys to disable remote electronic controllers. 
Therefore it is inevitable that Turkey will continue researching the best employment of 
these technologies against terrorism.  
The training of civilians in EW is also important. Protection of civilian aircraft 
and other modes of transportation against terrorist activities, electronic hardening of 
civilian governmental agencies, and protection of electronics against high-powered 
microwave weapons are some examples of how EW is applicable to the civilian sector. 
Training of civilians can help determine the vulnerabilities of civilian organizations and 
assets and can help to develop necessary protection measures. 
All EW-related personnel should be trained continually about IA and need-to-
know principles. Such training becomes more important when operating in an 
international environment, such as in bi-lateral or multi-national exercises and operations. 
It is crucial to protect national technology, tactics, and doctrine related to EW. 
The effectiveness of EW personnel is improved when they have knowledge of the 
three subdivisions; it is difficult to be a good ES or EP expert with no knowledge of EA 
applications and theories. The interrelationship between the three EW disciplines requires 
knowledge in all three areas to effectively perform within one.  
Being a core competency, the synchronization of EW is very important to IO 
efforts, as was investigated in this study. The technical side of this relationship, the most 
efficient employment of EW within IO activities and their limiting effects to each other, 
can be investigated and discussed in seminars, briefings, and lectures in Turkey. 
Technology  
Looking backward with a historical perspective, the conduct of EW during 
Operation DESERT STORM was far greater than what could have been predicted purely 
from the U.S. experience during the Vietnam War and prior conflicts. EW is increasingly 
integrated within military operations. It is certain that for the next conflict that Turkey 
might be involved in, there is going to be a very intense EW dimension. It is imperative 
that Turkey continue to emphasize EW research and development. Computer network 
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operations (CNO) and information assurance (IA) are unique and crucial areas that must 
be emphasized, as they relate to EW significantly. 
When purchasing an EW system from abroad, operational test and evaluation 
(OT&E) of the particular system is critical. The following requirements must be 
examined to determine the capability of the system with regard to Turkey’s needs: 
• Do performance specifications match national needs? Possibly being built 
for the producer’s operational environment, can the system accomplish the 
mission as desired in the operational environment of Turkey? 
• Is the system interoperable and compatible with the existing systems and 
platforms in Turkey? What are the challenges to system integration? 
• As EW technology is constantly changing. Therefore are the hardware and 
software of the system upgradeable, and is its documentation clear? 
• Does the system have an open architecture that can be modified according 
to future mission needs? 
• Does the system need a specific logistics support structure? Is the current 
structure suitable for maintaining logistics support? 
Intelligence on the latest technological developments in EW is important for 
Turkey. Being a regional power, it is crucial that Turkey continually update its 
information on the latest research. When necessary, technology transfer from leading 
countries in EW can be utilized to acquire the latest improvements, but this is not always 
the most efficient mechanism. Turkey must also continue to collect intelligence about the 
EW potential of neighboring countries, which can be a key factor in any possible future 
crisis. 
Turkey’s development of national EW software, cryptology, and platforms has 
been improving in the last decade. Lately, these improvements have even begun 
challenging the world market. This has come about through the government’s and the 
military’s realization of the importance of this area, resulting in increased budgets for 
research and development at organizations like HAVELSAN (the Turkish acronym for 
Aviation Electronics Industry), ASELSAN (the Turkish acronym for Military Electronics 
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Industry), and TUBITAK (the Turkish acronym for Turkey Science and Technology 
Research Organization). Turkey has continued to emphasize EW software, cryptology, 
and platforms, and is establishing new organizations concerned with the different 
disciplines of EW to achieve domestic market competence and to lead more 
development.  
Encompassing rapidly changing technologies, EW is similar to a very competitive 
cat and mouse game. It exhibits the characteristics of a constant race between EW 
disciplines. Each capability constantly tries to gain an advantage over the others. 
Therefore, the specifications of a platform or systems within a five-year acquisition 
program, for instance, may be obsolete by the time of delivery. This requires constant 
feedback from within EW technologies, a focus on future EW requirements prediction 
and careful monitoring of EW systems and platforms acquisition programs. 
EW is a crucial part of military exercises. EW integration to wargaming, military 
exercises, and combat scenarios must continue. The scenarios can be constructed in two 
ways. First, EW can be utilized as the primary tool for the scenario and evaluation of EW 
capabilities and assets can be performed; this can be done using modeling and simulation 
(M&S). Second, within military operations, EW can be utilized only as a small part of the 
overall exercise, which helps evaluate mutual impacts, both positive and negative, of EW 
during military operations. 
C. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The art of warfare has changed greatly; on today’s battlefield there are many more 
dependent, independent, and inter-dependent variables. Obtaining information dominance 
and decision superiority is at the heart of all warfare activities, no matter what kind of 
technology is used. Warfare is becoming more complicated due to its constantly changing 
face; modern warfare requires combined arms interoperability, coordination of branches 
in a particular service, integration between services, and even cooperation of other 
military and perhaps civilian agencies. Understanding the unique interactions between the 
capabilities and vulnerabilities of the IO competencies is critical to success and the 
attainment of the ultimate objective. This thesis makes conclusions in two areas: the 
advantages and disadvantages of IO and the relationship of electronic warfare to IO.  
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The military or government objective of any conflict is to ultimately achieve the 
national political objectives. IO is a critical tool in this regard for the following reasons: 
• Decision-making processes are the source of each and every action in 
human life, whether it is economic, military, or political. These processes 
are necessary during times of war and peace. As the ultimate objective of 
IO is to influence the adversary’s decision-making processes and protect 
the friendly decision-making process, this flexibility gives IO a very broad 
area of action. 
• IO has the capability to integrate the elements of national power—
political, economical, military, and informational—to achieve national 
objectives.  
• Conventional warfare is often applicable during conflict; however, IO 
possesses the potential to be applied throughout a broad spectrum, from 
peace to pre-hostility, crisis, war, post-war, and back to peace. Properly 
applied, IO considers the consequences of the battle beforehand and acts 
accordingly. This helps to avoid adverse consequences of warfare, such as 
collateral damage, excessive civilian casualties, and continuing national 
hatreds.  
• IO brings together not only the hard-kill capabilities of military 
operations, such as precision-guided bombs and ARMs, but also soft-kill 
capabilities, such as jamming, spoofing, and creating false targets. These 
capabilities, if coordinated, integrated, and synchronized carefully, are 
able to accomplish more than any one by itself. 
• Defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) and public affairs (PA) are 
among the related competencies of IO. These two competencies can be 
used to prevent a conflict by employing political and diplomatic processes. 
• IO is not a rule of thumb. In other words, it is not a concrete doctrine that 
applies equally to every situation. IO is an evolutionary process that 
emphasizes the vitality of information in the information age. That idea 
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enables IO to evolve its concepts, change its doctrine, and stay up-to-date 
as technology and tactics change.  
• Influencing the adversary’s decision-making cycle and protecting the 
friendly decision-making cycle receive equal emphasis under IO. It is a 
benefit of IO that it focuses on the protection of the decision-making cycle 
as much as influencing the adversary’s cycle by employing physical 
security, information assurance (IA), computer network defense (CND), 
electronic protection (EP), electronic warfare support (ES), operations 
security (OPSEC), and military deception (MILDEC). 
At this point a question might come to mind. Does IO have any disadvantages? 
Yes, some disadvantages or difficulties reside in the application of IO.  Some of these 
are: 
• IO education is difficult as it encompasses not only the military, but also 
civilians, political decision makers, and many other levels and structures 
of government and society. The interpretation and application of IO theory 
will vary according to the level, background, interests, and position of the 
individual. 
• As IO is a fairly new concept, the militaries in different countries 
understand and apply IO differently—if they have any IO considerations 
at all. Therefore, it is difficult to employ IO within a coalition force 
structure. 
• By itself there is no IO. IO is the synchronization, coordination, and 
integration of every information action that is done to achieve objectives. 
There is not one set of IO procedures that applies to every situation. 
• There is risk involved in coordination and integration of the actions of 
each competency if it takes too much time to reach a decision or to apply 
the decision in the real world. It can cause the loss of information 
superiority over the enemy and a slow down in the decision-making cycle. 
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• As information systems and technology become more integrated into both 
military and civilian environments there are more opportunities to exploit 
them. These opportunities contain inherent vulnerabilities that are subject 
to hostile activities. 
EW is a significant tool of IO and is also considered a core element. As explained 
in the historical perspectives of EW in this study, the first application of EW occured 
almost a century before the origin of IO theory and doctrine. As shown in the historical 
perspective, EW is becoming an indispensable element to be integrated with every other 
discipline of warfare, as they increasingly rely on the use and exploitation of the 
electromagnetic environment. 
As this study reveals, the relationship between EW and each IO competencies is 
not consistent across the core, supporting, and related competencies. The EW relationship 
to IO is strongest with the core competencies. 
EW is a force multiplier and requires considerable expertise. EW experts should 
be capable of integrating different elements of systems, have either engineering or 
operational experience, and be knowledgeable about the other elements of IO to be able 
to do their mission more efficiently. 
In any applications of IO, personnel working in different IO competencies should 
consider EW aspects in their disciplines. To accomplish this, the mutual relationship of 
EW and each competency should be thoroughly investigated as new technologies are 
included within IO processes.  
As seen in the investigation of the EW relationship to IO, use of some IO 
competencies might limit the usefulness or effectiveness of EW and vice versa. When 
conflict occurs, it is most likely that the interference can degrade the overall effectiveness 
of IO as well as the goal of the specific competency. This is an important point to 
consider in coordination efforts during IO planning and execution phases. 
During EW education and training, the overall place and role of EW within IO 
should be taught. This kind of training helps personnel to understand the roles and 
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missions of EW in the IO framework and also shortens the coordination and integration 
time with other competencies. 
Rapidly changing technology must be incorporated into IO efforts. This can be a 
cumbersome process if IO is not fully ready to accept and integrate those changes. The 
faster this is done the more efficient IO efforts are going to be. 
D. FURTHER STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis identifies many issues for further research. The following is a list of a 
few of these issues. A continuing investigation into these areas can increase the 
understanding of the evolution of electronic warfare and information operations doctrine, 
capabilities, and practice. 
• How do technological developments affect IO and how can they be 
integrated into IO? 
• What can be done to standardize IO across the branches, services, and 
perhaps nations? 
• How can the problem areas of coalition forces conducting joint IO around 
the globe be solved? 
• What is the best way to educate and train IO personnel? 
• Is there a need for IO organization or a structure to employ IO? 
• How do other IO competencies limit or influence EW activities? 
• What is the difference between IO applications during peace, war, and 
post-war periods?  
• Is there a need for “IO troops” and specific IO organizations? Or is 
treating it as being inherent to all activities the most efficient method? 
• Does IO use the available EW tools or can it actually dictate or derive the 
technological developments related to EW? 
• Is there an optimum balance between the exploitation of opportunities and 

























This appendix is the interview by 1LT Ali Can Kucukozyigit (Turkish Army) 
with Dr. Daniel C. Boger, Chairman of the Information Sciences Department at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. The interview focuses on 
Information Operations (IO) concepts.  
1. What was your involvement with Information Operations during your 
military and civilian career? 
I did have a relatively short military career during which I was interested and 
involved in Command and Control (C2) issues, to include C2W that is now known as 
Information Operations (IO). I have also been interested in Electronic Warfare (EW) and 
IO issues ever since I have started working here at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). 
My thrust has been how we can put together and integrate a plan to support the 
commander. That has been my primary area of interest. 
One of the things that I have watched over the years is what components of the 
definition of IO for the U.S. DOD have been included and which ones have not. We went 
through a phase a few years ago where physical destruction was defined as part of IO/IW, 
but of course it now has been taken out. It is a related/supporting competency at this 
point. It has been really interesting to watch the definitions change and the reasons for the 
definitions to change over the last few years. 
2. What are the things done at NPS in terms of educating IO warrior of today 
and the future? What are some practical applications experimented in IW 
department in terms of IO? 
The most important thing is try to get across to the students; yes there are 
important technical aspects that support IO and IW. But what we really want to focus on 
is what is happening in the mind of your adversary commander. That is what you want to 
change. We need to have effects and change his mind whether that is a military 
commander or a political leader. So consequently things like modeling particular  
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situations are important, not only the technical aspects of what is occurring in EW, CNO, 
etc., but also how the people really make decisions; how we can really affect those 
decisions is also important . 
One of things that we got started couple of years ago and got going recently again 
is situational modeling, which is really an attempt to set up a network of effects and 
investigate how those effects are interrelated to bring about a change in the perception of 
the commander. We do have a number of models available in that area that are focused 
on human decision makers. An important way that the educational program here at NPS 
is structured is trying to get students to understand that the technical and the soft side 
have to blend together in order to create the effects that you want. 
3. What would you think is the ultimate objective of IO operations? Is 
machinery like computers or humans? 
Clearly what you want to do through IO is to change the perception of the 
adversary commander. It is really oriented towards humans and that is what makes it so 
hard to implement. 
4. What would you say as a reason recently that made IO get more popular 
and more important? 
It is because, I think, people have recognized that it is really the effect that you 
want to create on your adversary and not how you do it. The other reason is the 
recognition of everyone that we live in a net centric world where we are all connected not 
only physically but also electronically, socially, etc. 
5. Do you have any idea of the first examples of IO conducted in history? 
I like to go back to Sun-Tzu and read his comments. The Art of War is an 
interesting book. Everybody who has anything to do with IO should take a look at it. 
What he was concerned with is effects and what is going on in the mind of your 




6. How did IO evolve from C2W and IW, what are the similarities and the 
differences between the three? 
C2W essentially was a fairly technical approach to the problems; it was merely 
viewed as Electronic Warfare Support (ES), Electronic Attack (EA), and Electronic 
Protection (EP) type of activities or other activities in the light of those. Using those, you 
can develop a technical system that will counter any effects that the enemy wants to have 
on you. This would allow you to counter any C2 systems that existed.  
   C2W evolved over the years to include the fact that it really is the commander 
that we want to affect along with his staff and major leaders. It was the recognition of 
people who worked C2W that there is a lot more to the problem than just being able to 
build that counter to the electronic portion of IO.  
The Navy still uses Information Warfare (IW) terminology. What they mean by 
IW tends to focus on CNO and EW as the most important elements of IO. They are 
coming around slowly to the recognition that OPSEC, MILDEC, PSYOP, etc. are also 
important; that recognition is due to the push from higher levels. 
There is one important point that we need to recognize. That is we are always 
doing IO. But we are not necessarily always doing IW. We probably do real IW only 
during wartime. That is an important dimension. 
7. In what ways is EW used in IO and what is the mutual relationship 
between the two? 
If you look at the three elements—EP, ES, and EA—it should be obvious to 
anyone that those are necessary in any sort of IO campaign. The electromagnetic 
spectrum is so important these days in modern militaries that you have to have EW 
components in your campaigns. If you don’t, you are doomed to fail. 
8. Would you please comment on the differences between IO and 
kinetic/conventional targeting? 
That is a good question. Again, it has to do more with the effects that we create. I 
think one of the reasons that IO has come to the fore over the last decade or so is the 
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recognition on the part of anyone who is concerned about military actions is that what 
you really want to do is to have an effect, to stop adversary military actions.  
IO is really just recognition that you don’t necessarily have to have a smoking 
hole in the ground in order for the adversary to stop their military actions; you can do 
other things. That is the obvious difference to me. Since IO focuses on the decision 
makers the problem becomes more complex. It is a lot easier for militaries to generate a 
smoking hole in the ground than to affect the mind of the adversarial commander. 
Smoking-hole actions are the ones that the militaries are very familiar with and find it 
easy to execute. 
9. In today’s armed forces we have artillery men, pilots, infantry, and many 
more. Do you think there is a need for ‘IO men’ now and is it possible to have a job 
like that and if so how can those men be trained? 
I guess I am torn internally about that issue from this perspective; your military 
commander must recognize that all these tools available to him from IO in order to wage 
an IO campaign are at least as important as his kinetic tools. If that is not so, then we 
have a problem. The final decision maker on using these IO tools instead of or in addition 
to using the kinetic tools needs to reside at the level of the military commander. So we 
need to make sure that all of the armed forces recognize that IO is important, and there 
needs to be some sort of training to convince them that IO is at least as important as the 
traditional branches of the combat arms. Your question is, do we need an IO specialist in 
order to do that? I guess my answer is that I hope we don’t. But if we have some failures 
where people have a tendency to ignore IO then we can find ourselves in very difficult 
situations. 
Maybe the IO specialist needs to be the Deputy Commander. There are various 
ways that you can organize, and that is clearly an important issue. But do we need IO 
specialists? IO is so broad; that is the difficulty. However, we obviously need specialists 
in every competency including related and supporting ones. But it is really hard to bring 




really need is a change in the way the commanders think about the problem. I don’t have 
the answer to how to do this best, but I do know the end state. I am just not sure how to 
get there yet. 
10. World nations are getting better and better in coalition conducting 
conventional warfare and peacekeeping operations. What would you say about the 
things to be done to create better coalitions in the IO realm? Is coalition necessary 
for IO? 
A coalition is absolutely necessary for IO, because IO attempts to change the way 
that adversary decision makers think about the problems. What that means is that there is 
a strong element of culture imbedded in IO. Consequently, you need people to look at 
different cultures with their own perspective. And that is the reason for a coalition, I 
think. At this point a coalition is really helpful. 
We need all these specialists in the various competencies in order to put together a 
better coalition. But we also need a cultural understanding of how the adversary really 
thinks about the problem, which is really hard for any nation. If each coalition partner 
comes with a different view of how the adversary thinks about problems, than I think we 
can have a better outcome to be able to better affect the adversary decision-making 
process. On the other hand, a coalition in IO is also difficult because what each and every 
country understands about IO is not the same. 
11. What can be and what is being done to educate the military officer of all 
ranks to grasp the importance of IO in the United States? Or is it just the junior 
officers who are taught of IO? 
It is taking a while to change the bureaucracy in this country, as it is so large. I 
know each of the senior service colleges has a module on IO. I am not sure about the 
intermediate service colleges. One of the things that gives me hope is the fact that we do 
have a number of people in important positions who understand the importance of IO, for 
example the Secretary of Defense’s IO Roadmap in 2003. This is an important document 
that emphasizes the importance of IO. 
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Educating junior officers is one of the best ways, but that has a twenty year time 
horizon, because they can’t convince the admirals and generals. Actually generals and 
admirals are also given some briefings and seminars about IO. People are recognizing the 
importance of IO and Network Centric Operations; those two go together. 
12. Is it correct to say IO is more important for Air Force and less important 
for Army and Marines? And what is the role of Joint Staff in supervising IO 
conducts of each service? 
No. I would say that any service that engages the enemy needs to recognize that 
IO is an important component and set of tools that you can use to bring about the desired 
outcome. That is why it is important for every armed service in the United States.  
The Joint Staff attempts to coordinate policy that comes down from the Secretary 
of Defense and all the offices that work directly for him. They are really responsible for 
integrating the joint aspects of IO.  
However it is true that each of the services has different levels of capabilities 
across the competencies, and there is no need to make them identical in terms of their 
capabilities with regard to IO. Services may differ in the weights of the competency that 
they use, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that one is using IO more than the other. What 
the Joint Staff tries to do is to make sure that whenever a combatant commander has to 
take an action he has the capabilities he needs. 
13. As we know IO has potential to prevent wars because it can be conducted 
during pre-hostility or peacetime. Do we have an example of this in the past? If not, 
how can this be achieved? 
A recent example is the case of Mr. Kaddafi in Libya. Once he saw that the U.S. 
was serious about fighting the terrorism, he said that he didn’t want to be involved in 
terrorism anymore. I would maintain that this was an IO campaign. It might not have 
been designed to be an IO campaign by the President, but it had the same affect through 
public diplomacy. He saw that the President was willing to take military action in 
Afghanistan and Iraq to try to eliminate areas that were supporting terrorists. He stated 
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that he is not interested in terrorist activities anymore. I would state that this was an IO 
campaign. 
14. Do you think in the future there will be an IO commander and IO 
troops? Why? And if yes, would it be supported or supporting command? 
That goes back to your question about IO specialist. If the commander does not 
take advantage of all the tools that are available to him to cause effects on the adversary, 
then he has failed. Whether we need IO troops depends upon the scenario in some we 
might need IO troops and some we might not. The important thing here is that whoever is 
in charge of the military action has to recognize that there are IO components that they 
can use, even using the smoking holes. It has got to be supported, because IO is in 
everything that is going on; it is never separate. 
15. Can IO be conducted such a way that it becomes effective to a non- 
information age nation or theatre? How can we succeed over an enemy who does not 
have IO instruments but has only conventional warfare equipments and mindset? 
Absolutely. But you would have less EW and less CNO involved in it. However, 
you would still have PSYOP, OPSEC, MILDEC, and others. You can change the 
structure and apply it to any specific area. In this case, the weights on the components 
will change based upon the technological capability of your adversary. 
16. Do you think the popularity of IO will die away or can it live forever? 
To an extent you define IO as an attempt to change the way your adversary thinks 
about the problem. From that perspective it is never going to go away. The tools that we 
use will certainly change depending upon the technology we and the adversary have. 
However the concept, to change the way the adversary thinks, will never go away. 
17. What are your comments about the future of IO? 
It depends on what technological changes we expect in the future. As the world 
becomes more technologically advanced, I would expect to see more tools become 
available for use by commanders in the realm of IO. How that takes shape, of course, 
would require me to have the capability to predict how technologies are actually going to 
change the world. I can’t predict it, obviously. 
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1. What is the Wild Weasel exactly and how was it first created? 
The Wild Weasel (WW) is based more on the mission than on the aircraft itself. 
The WW mission is to suppress or defeat enemy surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs). The key 
here is looking back to history a little bit. During the Vietnam War, the American Air 
Force was conducting bombing operations in the disputed areas of Vietnam, including 
North Vietnam. The Russians were assisting the North Vietnamese to resist us. At one 
point early in the war, around 1965, the Russians brought in SAM systems. They were 
radar guided SAMs, and the Americans were not ready for this; therefore they took a lot 
of losses. They did not have radar warning receivers (RWR) on board the aircraft, they 
did not know when they were being shot. They did not have any means to counter the 
SAMs other than finding the spot from which they were being shot and then dropping a 
bomb on them. But that was also very dangerous because most of those systems were 
protected by anti-aircraft-artillery (AAA), so just to go in to bomb them was dangerous.  
So after many losses, the US government entered into a program with industry to 
develop an aircraft with systems onboard, and crews that were trained to do a new 
mission, which was to defeat the enemy SAM. Defeating the enemy SAM became known 
as the ‘Wild Weasel’ mission.  
Initially, it was a type of radar warning receiver (RWR) that allowed the WW 
aircraft to detect the SAM when the enemy radar came on the air and then to track on it, 
not necessarily to a geographical position but to a homing direction, to be able to track 
and then find the SAM site. The Weasels did not have missiles back then to shoot back, 
This appendix includes the interview by 1LT Ali 
Can Kucukozyigit (Turkish Army) with Mr. Edward 
Fisher (Lt Col, USAF—Retired) about the Wild 
Weasels during the Vietnam War and the First Gulf 
War. Mr. Fisher is a retired Wild Weasel EWO. His 
detailed biography is at the end of the interview. 
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so what they still had to do was to find the SAM site, and either bomb it themselves, 
guide other aircraft to bomb it, or go in and strafe it. For these reasons, it was a very 
dangerous mission.  
Initial efforts were unsuccessful as the crews were learning how to use their gear; 
they took a lot of losses because it was still dangerous. As time went on, the aircrews got 
better and they started to take out the SAM sites.  
Next the Navy developed an anti-radiation-missile (ARM) called the ‘Shrike’ that 
could home on enemy radar emissions. That missile allowed the aircraft to stand a little 
farther away, but still within the range of SAM, making it more of an even match in this 
situation. Then Americans’ losses were reduced.  
I flew the Wild Weasel from 1986 to 1996, and during this time we had the high 
speed anti-radiation-missiles (HARMs) that had a range which was greater than the 
SAMs we were currently facing. This meant that the Wild Weasel aircraft could stay 
outside of the SAM range, if needed, and shoot their HARMs without the risk of being 
targeted by known SAM systems.  
There is a problem with this idea, because it takes a while for the HARM to reach 
its target, and the farther away you are the more time it takes the missile to hit a site. 
During this time, the SAM is free to engage other aircraft, because it has about a 20-
second engagement time. If my missile has a 40- or 50-second time of flight to the site, 
then my shooting a missile does not do a lot of good to my wingman or my strike 
package. So it was my philosophy to fly close to the site and thus support my strike 
package. There was always a small chance to be hit by a really good SAM operator that 
was able to engage me first, but I always felt pretty confident that I would defeat him.  
That was the Wild Weasel mission. It is similar to a cowboy shootout where the 
Weasel crew tries to shoot the SAM, and the SAM tries to take the aircraft down. The 
one that gets to target the other quickest and hits it accurately eventually wins—kind of a 
‘quick draw’ contest. It is much more high-tech nowadays. 
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2. What was the ‘Hunter Killer’ mission? Was it different from the Wild 
Weasel mission? Could you explain it? 
It is a type of Wild Weasel mission. It means that one aircraft hunts, it does not 
necessarily kill the SAM, and another aircraft kills it. F-100 aircraft did not have the 
capability to carry a lot of bombs, while the F-105 was able to carry more bombs. So the 
F-100 Wild Weasel hunts the SAM site, locates it and using the radio points the site out 
to the other aircraft, points out where the SAM is, and then lets the other aircraft come in 
with the heavy bomb load and take out the SAM.  
That is the Hunter Killer mission; one aircraft hunts and another aircraft gets to 
kill it. 
3. As we know, there were electronic warfare officers (EWOs) in the fighter 
planes. What were their jobs? 
The Navy calls it electronic counter-measures officer (ECMO) but it still means 
the same thing. The job of the electronic warfare officers (EWOs) in the F-4G was to 
manage the electronic battle. While the pilot flew the airplane, the EWO, also called guy-
in-back (GIB), would watch the instruments and equipment in the aircraft and manage 
how the data was gathered from the radars, and determine which threats the EWO wanted 
to look at, prioritizing the threats, monitoring the information. When he had enough 
information the aircraft could attack the threats in the order of optimum priority that he 
determined.  
If the job is to protect the area for the strike package, according the determined 
priority it may be a SAM site or an anti-aircraft-artillery (AAA), the aircraft can hit the 
targets at the appropriate time. Another thing that the EWO does is manage time. It is not 
good to shoot all four HARM missiles ten minutes before the strike package arrives. If 
every aircraft does that and there are no more missiles to shoot, the SAMs come back on-
air when the strike package comes and start to engage the strikers. Managing time and 
missiles means to shoot them at the most appropriate time to best support the strike 
package. That is how we did it, and this is the job of the EWO in general.  
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In the F-4G, the EWO normally shot the HARM, because with his electronic 
displays in the back, he is the one to best decide when he has enough of the right data 
gathered to hit the target. But the pilot is still able to do the shooting upfront if desired or 
necessary. During the Gulf War, I did let my pilot shoot one of the HARMs in a non-
urgent situation.  
In the Air Force, an EWO can fly the airplane, because there are controls in the 
back seat. But in the Navy, in the EA-6B, EWOs actually do not have the controls so they 
cannot fly the airplane. So there are two different philosophies in terms of flying aircraft. 
EWOs were not necessarily treated as pilots but like a co-pilot without all the experience 
of a pilot.  
I had a chance to fly the aircraft in formation flying and also in an aerial refueling, 
but in approaches and take-offs, the pilots have to have control of the aircraft. However 
there are many EWOs, including myself, that went to “pre-navigation school,” which 
meant they went through pilot training and they washed out before completion; and 
almost everybody I know had some stick time and did some flying. I had a lot of flight 
experience already and felt comfortable with my flying skills. I flew a lot but not during 
combat, where the professionalism takes over: the pilot flies the airplane and the EWO 
manages the EOB, which together brings the mission to a success. During the longer 
missions in the Gulf War, we took turns napping. My pilot slept for a while and I flew the 
plane, and then I slept while he flew the plane. 
4. Could you tell us why there was a need for such tactics and missions 
during the Vietnam War? And what were the threats posed by the North 
Vietnamese Armed Forces? 
The key is that SAMs were relatively effective. We did not know how to defeat 
them; they were new to us, we did not have tactics built to defeat them, and therefore, at 
first, they were very lethal. But we now know how to defeat the SA-2 system using 
electronic countermeasures (ECM) jamming, plus we know how to maneuver to defeat 
them. But the airmen then did not know the maneuver and jamming techniques, so they 
suffered a lot of losses.  
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Because the SAM threat was so effective, it drew the development of the Wild 
Weasel mission and also development of electronic counter-measures, jamming pods, and 
the use of chaff in burst mode. So we learned how to defeat SAM systems by trial and 
error. But later on, SAMs became more accurate and faster and also became able to pull 
more Gs, shoot more missiles, and track more targets. But at the same time our tactics 
became more lethal with a better ARM and better stand-off ranges. We learned how to 
integrate our packages better; we had better ECM and jamming pods. So this is the 
constant race between electronic attack (EA) and electronic protection (EP), trying to stay 
ahead of the enemy. 
5. Was it not a solution to fly lower against SAMs? 
That worked against initial SA-2 systems. But what they did was that they put 
SA-2s over the valleys and they arranged AAA traps at lower altitudes, so when the 
aircraft went low, they got shot by AAA. Interestingly, there were more aircraft losses by 
AAA fire then there was by SAM fire. Although aircraft often went low in Vietnam, 
during the Gulf War we went high because we had ways to defeat the SAM systems, and 
we wanted to stay out of the AAA. That showed that we learned our lesson. Especially 
vivid from the first days of the Gulf War were the losses of British Tornados in the lower 
altitudes because of their delivery systems that forced them low. 
6. What is the purpose of the Radar Homing and Warning (RHAW) system 
and how was it developed? 
There are two different types of RHAW gear; one is a RHAW system and the 
other one a radar warning receiver (RWR). The main difference between the two is that 
RWR gives us a rough idea of where the threat is and a rough idea of what kind of threat 
it is. RHAW is typically more like an electronic warfare support (ES) system; it has more 
accuracy, it is capable of giving a fairly good location rather than just a cut, it gives us 
better idea of what kind of threat we are against, and it also gives us some of the 
parameters of the threat like pulse width (PW), pulse repetition frequency (PRF), and also 
analyzes them with a high degree of accuracy to find out what kind of threat we are 
against. If there is an ambiguity between a few emitters, then RHAW has more chance to 
eliminate this ambiguity than RWR. 
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I can say that RHAW is an advanced type of RWR, but technology has developed 
so much through the years that RWR now is as good or better than RHAW was in the 
past.  
7. Where does Wild Weasel fit in the EW umbrella? 
It can be considered electronic attack (EA) most of the time, as the job of Wild 
Weasel is to suppress, maybe destroy, enemy SAM systems or enemy radars in general, 
which fits into EA. You can also take down non-SAM radars.  
The systems are good enough nowadays that the data being gathered can be used 
to target other systems. I can gather data in a Wild Weasel aircraft like an EF-18G 
Growler or EA-6B on the enemy EOB and pass that information with data link, voice 
communication or downloads after the mission and allow the operational commander to 
make the choices on how to target those radar sites. Maybe he will use the army artillery 
or multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to attack some of these radar sites along the 
forward edge of the battlefield. So those all can be considered as an ES mission.  During 
the Vietnam War, what Wild Weasels did was mostly EA. They couldn’t do ES because 
the systems did not have enough memory, they did not have good tape systems to record 
the data, and they did not have any data links. With data links now one can call the 
mission an ES or signals intelligence (SIGINT) mission as well as EA. 
8. Was the mission of Wild Weasels to destroy all radar sites or to reduce 
their effectiveness by making them remain silent during the air strike? 
It was both, but what I personally preferred was to destroy of course; to see 
concrete results. But what I actually did for the most part was suppression not 
destruction. In other words, the sites would stay off the air, and after I shot my missile 
they would turn off the radar which meant they couldn’t launch a missile against my 
buddy flying an F-16, so I did my job. However you don’t get as much satisfaction as 
actually destroying something. The primary mission is to suppress the radars, especially 
lethal ones that are target radars in a specific area, to allow the strike package to hit the 
target. You are not shooting or killing everything, everywhere; instead you are trying to 
make sure that the radars are ineffective. If you don’t kill the radar, it is there the next day  
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and you have to face it day after day. The perfect Wild Weasel is the one that can kill the 
radar even if it goes off the air, and I believe that is where our research and development 
is heading towards.  
In the old days, if the radar went off the air after I launched my missile, the 
missile would go ‘stupid’ and it would have to go and look for another radar target. So 
what is desired is a terminal homing capability on the missile that takes over from the 
passive radar homing and can see the target, with millimeter wave radar or infrared (IR), 
and then kill the target. The threat that is killed today cannot come back to kill you 
tomorrow! 
9. How did North Vietnamese adapt the tactics they used in time? What were 
they doing? 
It is very simple. What they did was first, using SAM systems, to force the aircraft 
to fly low. Second, of course, they modified the gear. They started out with the first SA-2 
system and then they got another SA-2 system that operated in a different frequency 
range. That missile was improved; it had longer range, lower altitude capable. Then they 
got the TV tracking system that was mounted on the SAM so they were able to guide it 
partially optically. They added range only radar so we had two radars to jam on the site; 
range-only radar and the tracking radar. This created frequency diversity. Then they 
brought in a new SAM system, the SA-3 with a whole new frequency, whole new 
capability, and a whole new threat. They tried to shoot SAMs without guidance, at first 
ballistic, by just pointing and shooting it then turning on the radar at the last minute; 
hopefully with enough time to guide the missile to intercept the American aircraft and 
shoot it down. A lot of times that did not work, but occasionally it did. The reason for 
their tactic changes was of course that Wild Weasel missions, electronic 
countermeasures, and counter-SAM tactics were achieving some success. 
10. Did the United States use similar tactics in the following battles like 
Afghanistan and the 1st and 2nd Gulf Wars? 
Yes we used Wild Weasels and we also used equipment which was much more 
effective. As I mentioned earlier, we had newer weapons, HARMs, better homing gear or 
RHAW, the APR-47, which is much better than the initial systems that were on the Wild 
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Weasels in the Vietnam War. We had better accuracy, more speed and also we had the 
support of other new aircraft that we did not have during Vietnam; we had radar jamming 
aircraft EF-111 and EA-6B whose role was to jam the surveillance, acquisition and early 
warning radars that provided targeting and guidance to the threat radars. What is great 
about that is if you jam those surveillance radars or the early warning radars then the 
threat radars have to turn on longer because they have to find the target on their own. 
They don’t get the data passed to them, and their turning on longer gives Wild Weasel or 
defense suppression aircraft a better chance to kill them. That capability was wonderful, 
that added a lot more lethality to the defense suppression mission. Figure 35 below is a 
photograph after a post-mission debrief. 
 
Figure 35.   In post-mission debrief after a sortie near Baghdad, Feb. 1991 (to the right is 
then Capt. Ed Fisher’s crewed pilot, Capt., Vinnie Farrell) 
 
The Wild Weasel aircraft is now the F-16CJ with the HARM Targeting System. 
This aircraft carries out the same mission that the F-4G did during the first Gulf War but 
it does not have an EWO on board. The gear that gathers the EOB automatically does 
most of the job that the EWO used to do, and the pilot doesn’t make as many decisions as 
he used to do about what to target, which to my mind is a reduced capability but still 
effective enough to cause the enemy significant problems. Now the EA-6B we have has 
replaced the EF-111, and there are no more EF-111s. The EA-6B does the same job the 
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EF-111 was doing during the Gulf War but does it better with newer systems. There are 
three EWOs in that aircraft, actually they are called ECMOs, and one pilot; this still 
emphasizes the role of the EWO.  
The EA-18G Growler will have two people in it; one pilot and one ECMO or 
EWO. So there will still be EWOs onboard that airplane too. There is still a need for 
EWOs, although in many modern systems most of the process is done automatically; but 
the systems still cannot make all the decisions for us. Moreover pilots are very busy 
trying to survive and do their parts in the mission, and I can say that they are very close to 
being task saturated. So it is very difficult to get all the jobs done with only one person. 
12. Do you think tactical concepts should change along with the new 
technologies or new technologies must adapt to the existent tactics? 
With tactical concepts, you have to always look at the threat first and then you 
have to adapt your tactics to defeat the threat. Accordingly, you develop technologies that 
allow you to do that. That is the way to fight the future enemy, it is important not to have 
technology drive military tactics. If we are complacent with technology, then someone 
smarter than us might go ahead and develop new tactics and weapons that surprise us and 
catch us off-guard. That is what happened in Vietnam. We had adapted certain 
technologies like aircraft that flew fast but didn’t maneuver very well, didn’t have any 
ECM onboard them, and dropped bombs. But the Russians and North Vietnamese 
introduced new SAM systems and we had to change very quickly. You don’t want to be 
complacent with your technology. Of course to some degree it is normal for technology 
to derive tactics, but my belief is that first and foremost you need to look at the enemy 
now and in the future and try to anticipate what the enemy will do, what kind of 
equipment the enemy will have, what kind of tactics they are going to use, and then 
develop tactics that would defeat the enemy. You then develop capabilities and 
technology that will support these tactics and defeat this future enemy. This is hopefully 
what the US and Allies all around the world are trying to do. 
13. What do you miss the most about those years as a Wild Weasel? 
I miss the camaraderie of all the guys. We were friends, we were doing the same 
thing, we thought that we had a very important job to do, and we were proud to do it. I 
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also miss the excitement of doing something that is new, different, and a little crazy. We 
were the tip of the spear. There was a lot of excitement involved in that mission. But any 
job can become routine eventually, even flying a fighter aircraft or driving a tank or 
fighting fires. But every now and then there is a small change that actually excites you. 
During DESERT STORM, my first mission across the border I was very excited. I was 
very nervous and concerned that I wouldn’t be able to do a good enough job. But after 
three or four missions, I was no longer concerned. I knew that I was doing a good job. 
Going across the border did not scare me like it did the first day, and it became as routine 
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This appendix is the interview by 1LT Ali Can Kucukozyigit (Turkish Army) 
with Mr. Edward L. Fisher who is a lecturer of Information Sciences at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. The interview is about Information 
Operations (IO) concepts and the role Electronic Warfare (EW) plays in IO. 
1. What is your involvement with Information Operations (IO) during your 
military and civilian career? 
Obviously, one of the pillars of IO is EW, and as an EWO in the F-4G, I was 
working directly in what is now defined as a part of IO, but at the time I didn’t know that. 
When I actually became aware of IO was in 1999 following my service in Italy and 
Germany for the Kosovo War. I got a call from my deputy group commander offering me 
a job in Hawaii to go to the staff at Pacific Command, and he said I was going to work 
for J-39, the IO Division. I accepted without any idea of what it was. When I was in the 
dentist’s office in the process of leaving I saw an Air Power Journal, one the articles of 
which was about IO. Reading it was my first information about IO. Then I went to my 
joint IO assignment without any training to be a joint staff officer. I can say that I learned 
about IO through on-the-job training, being in the Pacific Command and developing 
products, training, lectures, briefings, and plans all involving IO. That is how I was 
introduced to IO. 
 I served at PACOM for three years in the IO division; I did doctrine and training 
and traveled a lot. Also I trained the concepts of IO to US officers there as well as foreign 
officers in the Philippines and Thailand. I became a plans officer through on the job 
training and learned how to use JOPES Volume 1 and 2 and create plans, how to format 
them, how to take the products from every area expert and integrate them all together and 
then present it up the channel to the headquarters. That was the end of my military IO 
career.  
Later on, I went to Malaysia to work in the Office of Defense Cooperation in the 
US Embassy. At that time, I realized that IO was the future direction in which the US 
military was moving. My IO background helped me to get the job here at the Naval 
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Postgraduate School (NPS) Information Sciences Department. At the moment I am 
teaching IO at the post graduate level. 
2. What do you think is the ultimate objective of IO operations?  
Is it machinery like computers or humans? 
The ultimate objective of IO is to ensure that you have information dominance 
and the enemy does not. In a sense, it means that you have the information you need to 
defeat the enemy and to win the battle or the war, on the other hand the enemy does not 
have the information he needs do the same to you. That is a very broad definition of its 
ultimate purpose.  
One thing we want to do is try to influence the way the enemy thinks. We are 
going to try to affect his mind. That is done through public diplomacy, using strategic 
information and PSYOP, trying to make the enemy think in a way that you want him to 
think and to influence their actions in a way that is favorable to you.  
So the ultimate objective of IO is to influence the way the adversary commander 
thinks and consequently have him or her misallocate resources, to deter the enemy from 
taking actions that you don’t want them to take or to mislead them so that they take an 
action that creates an advantage for you. This can be done through deception, operations 
security (OPSEC), PSYOP, EW in all three levels; tactical, operational, and strategic. 
The ultimate purpose is causing the president or the prime minister of the state to give up 
the fight, to surrender, or not to fight in the first place. In a perfect diplomatic world, no 
one would fight at all because they would be afraid to fight. You would pose a credible 
threat or you would make them think you were a credible threat. 
3. What are the things done at NPS in terms of educating the IO warriors of 
today and the future? What are some practical applications experimented in the IS 
department in terms of IO? 
Although I am fairly new here I can say that we provide a great set of courses that 
teaches officers how to think about IO and how to apply it. These courses introduce IO at 
low levels but make them think in higher levels about how to apply, plan, integrate, and 
synchronize it and also how to target the IO threats. In addition we have some 
laboratories like the EW laboratory and in-class laboratory exercises; using these we also 
do research and development (R&D) in the area of IO. I am personally involved in R&D 
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in the wireless command and control systems and networks. We try to use 802.11 and 
802.16 protocols to enable the tip-of-the-spear user to gain as much intelligence 
information as is available and have it channeled down to him or her and have all the 
information gathered by the tip-of-the-spear channeled up to the headquarters at the local, 
operational, and strategic levels and keep the information flowing in both directions. That 
is C2W in a sense which is still a part of IO. There is a lot more R&D carried out and 
classes given at NPS but I am not personally aware of all of them. 
4. What would you say is a reason recently that made IO more popular and 
more important? 
Honestly, what brought it out is computers. EW, PSYOP, and all the others have 
been around for a long time, and then we started talking about C2W and how to integrate 
everything and fight a more efficient battle. But computers brought us to the information 
age more than anything else, enabling us to share information rapidly, quickly, almost 
instantaneously around the world. As we can do this, we get hungry for more 
information. As we are hungry for information we have to satisfy that hunger. We have to 
use that information quickly, such as for precision guided munitions, so we need that 
information in real time or near real time.  
We have dominance of information now in the way we fight wars. America 
decided that the side that gains information quickest and then knows how to use that 
information properly will probably win the battle. So this consequently led us to think of 
information not just as a tool but as a weapon. After thinking like this, you need to 
integrate this into your doctrine. Obviously the side that can take all the different aspects 
and pillars of IO properly and can integrate those best on the battlefield or maybe even 
the diplomatic arena is going to prevail and win. This concept can even help us in 
keeping the peace and avoiding battles. Those all led us to C2W, then information 
warfare (IW), and then IO. 
5. How did IO evolve from C2W and IW, what are the similarities and the 
differences between the three? 
C2W was focused on the C2 issues but not on diplomacy and PSYOP as much. It 
really didn’t take into account affecting the mind of the commander. To me, it seems to be 
more focused on EW jamming of C2 networks, and a little bit of PSYOP. But when you 
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added computers into play and began to talk about strategic information operations and 
public diplomacy you begin to think about IW and IO. IO and IW, in my mind, is the 
same thing. Why we stopped saying IW, maybe we wanted to sound kind and gentle; I 
am not sure of this. Honestly, IW is IO during war, which is what it really is. But I think 
when we say IO, it goes from peace to crisis to conflict to war to after-the-war period and 
then back to peace. In other words, it is applied across the full spectrum. So I think 
people then decided not to limit this full spectrum into the term ‘warfare.’ As a result, in 
most of the doctrine the term IW is not used anymore; but to me they are the same thing. 
6. Can you give examples of the first IO conducted in history? 
Remember! Anything that was a part of IO now conducted in the past was also IO 
but we just did not call it that. Dropping chaff during WWII was a part of IO too for 
example. If you really want to take a point of departure for when you think IO actually 
started being done as real IO, it would probably be either the Gulf War or the Kosovo 
conflict. During the Gulf War, we started to gather information more quickly and used 
that information more immediately, but at the same time we still took the air tasking 
order (ATO), printed it out, and had it taken out by helicopters to navy ships. 
Nevertheless, when compared to the Iraqis, did we dominate information? The answer is 
yes. We jammed their C2 networks, denied them a lot of information; but I think what we 
were doing was more C2W back then.  
With Kosovo, there was a pressure to very quickly target and learn what the 
Serbians were doing, deny them any operational advantage, to target what they perceived 
strategically important to them, to force them to give up without ever starting the ground 
conflict. Remember that it was just an air war and psychological war. So I think that was 
probably more of an information war, and since then each war is becoming more 
important in terms of information dominance. We need to pick targets quicker, get the 
critical information to get those targets quicker, and then to hit those targets quicker in 
order to decrease our OODA loop time and deny the enemy’s ability to properly complete 
their OODA loop. As a result, to me Kosovo was the first IO-type war, and there has 
been an increase in emphasis on information since that conflict. However there is no real 
point of departure for IO, it is an evolutionary process, not a revolution. 
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7. In what ways is EW used in IO and what is the mutual relationship 
between the two? 
That is a tough question. With my perspective and background as an EWO, I 
know that EW existed prior to the knowledge of IO. But you can jam the enemy radars 
and at the same time when you can also broadcast a diplomatic message to deter the 
enemy. That means lots of different things might be wrapped together, EW can support 
IO in many different ways. EW can be used to jam communications therefore denying the 
enemy information, the ability to gather electronic information on the electromagnetic 
environment. 
 Perhaps deception can be done performing electronic deception in support of a 
military deception. This was done during WWII, dropping chaff and setting up false 
radars. You can also conduct jamming in support of deception.  
In addition there is no reason why I cannot jam wireless networks; EW can 
influence computer network operations (CNO) by jamming or deceiving wireless 
networks.  
So it is obvious that EW can be used to support the other competencies of IO 
depending upon how you want to utilize it, but it can also be done for the sake of EW 
alone to win the battle. You don’t have to think about it as IO pillar but if you do you 
definitely gain advantage by mutual synchronization with the different pillars. 
8. Would you please comment on the differences between IO and 
kinetic/conventional targeting? 
IO is going to support conventional targeting, or the destruction mission, of 
course, by direct and indirect means. Part of IO is to deny the ability of the enemy to 
conduct conventional targeting, his ability to gather information about where your forces 
are, what your forces entail. Therefore, the enemy cannot target you conventionally. At 
the same time, conventional targeting can support IO, for example, if I can take down an 
EW site through jamming or hard bombs from aircraft. To convince an enemy to 
surrender instead of killing him, I can drop leaflets on a battalion and the next night I 
attack that battalion. Then I drop leaflets on a battalion located near that one and threaten 
them by doing the same destruction to them as well unless they surrender. In this example 
you are using conventional attack or destruction to support psychological operations. The 
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same kind of example can apply to CNO as well. If the network is well protected and you 
can not get a virus into it, you can just drop a bomb on the network center and take down 
the whole network. So we can say that IO supports conventional targeting and 
conventional targeting supports IO. 
9. In today’s armed forces we have artillery personnel, infantry, and many 
more. Do you think there is a need for ‘IO man’ in the future? 
Both yes and no. As you develop through your career you gain more 
responsibility and of course have a broader picture. For example when I went to the staff 
I learned how to develop plans and integrate more capabilities into them. I gained a 
broader perspective. You have to learn not only the job of the ‘simple’ infantryman but 
also close air support, naval gun support, artillery, and so on. The same thing applies to 
IO as well. At the basic level the EWO in the back of an aircraft whose job is only to jam 
does not necessarily have to know a lot about integrating IO, but for sure he or she must 
be aware of it. But the responsible one at the staff who plans the missions, integrates the 
different plans, and develops operational concepts must know how to defeat the enemy 
using IO. That person needs to be trained in not only one or two specialty areas of IO but 
also in how to integrate them and how to utilize IO. 
 One way to learn this is by professional education. A new recruit receives much 
training in the beginning about how the military works; for this person half an hour or 
one hour of IO training is enough. With this training at least he or she knows that IO 
exists, but actually they do not need to know much more than that. At the next level, like 
squad leader, flight leader, that individual has to go a little deeper in IO training, know 
what the other pillars are, and understand how they support each other. After that when 
you go to the staff and gain more responsibility you learn a lot more about IO and how it 
integrates and synchronizes. Then actually we can say that this person is becoming an ‘IO 
man.’ 
IO is one of the major pillars of combat power, but I personally don’t think that 
we need IO personnel like artillery, infantry, or let’s say pilots. I believe information is 
used throughout all the pillars of combat power literally everywhere. Information 
inundates us, surrounds us. To me we need to train staff officers to help us plan IO but if 
they aren’t available, we have to go back to an IO specialty, and I believe they are best 
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people to have been trained for those jobs. They might become IO staff officers over the 
years. However, to have a whole IO identity, I don’t think that is the way to go. 
10. World nations are getting better and better in coalition when conducting 
conventional warfare and peacekeeping operations. What would you say about the 
things to be done to create better coalition forces in IO? Is coalition inevitable for 
IO or a strong country can conduct IO by itself without help of other nations? 
I believe that in the modern world, for the most part we need to think of coalition 
operations. It is very hard to do anything without the help of other nations, so you need to 
integrate your IO capabilities. That can be as basic as frequency spectrum management. 
Maybe one country is sending out a PSYOP message but the other allied country may 
cause it to look like a lie. You need to work together as allies and coalition partners 
integrating IO; so the bottom line is if you are doing IO, you need to have coalition 
forces, liaisons, and staff officers between the different capabilities of IO among the 
countries communicating with each other for coordination.  That is actually the whole 
power of IO; the coordination. If you fail to coordinate, you are going to cause yourself 
great difficulties and maybe even loss of the battle or loss of the war and perhaps the 
peace. In peacekeeping operations you can use PSYOP-type capabilities, such as 
distributing leaflets, to get information to the displaced refuges about your camps, food, 
water, and shelter. A psychological operations task force can do that very well. That 
means you can use the traditional pillars of IO in the support of peacekeeping operations. 
Even though the United Nations (UN) is not going to jam some country’s frequency 
spectrum, they still have to be aware of EW because they must be sure that their 
frequency spectrum is properly managed so that they don’t jam each other. We need IO 
in peacekeeping operations and definitely have to coordinate it. 
11. What can be and what is being done to educate the military officer of all 
ranks to grasp the importance of IO in United States? Or is it just the junior officers 
who are taught of IO? 
It is taught at all levels. I spent many hours talking to flag officers and generals at 
Pacific Command about the concept of IO an how to integrate it with the missions in the 
Pacific theater. Like junior officers, generals also get professional training about IO 
through briefings and seminars. It is obvious that an older military officer does not think 
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of IO as a young officer thinks because young officers hear and get training about it 
throughout their career so they readily understand and accept most IO concepts and 
capabilities. That is the nature of life; you resist things as you get older, except for those 
who are very forward thinking and dynamic. If you don’t train each and every level of 
personnel, then you can’t implement IO. Any of the juniors will not be able to do 
anything without convincing the general, which is why senior officers need to receive 
some IO education also. 
12. Is it correct to say IO is more important for Air Force and less important 
for Army and Marines? And what is the role of Joint Staff in supervising IO 
conducts of each service? 
I believe that IO is equally important for all the services. The Air Force does more 
airborne EW than the Army does, but the Army uses more PSYOP than the Air Force; 
both are important elements of IO. More usage of one element for a service does not 
mean that IO is more important for that service. The joint staff is responsible for overall 
training of all the services in the different theaters and for guiding the service components 
on how to train, think, and integrate IO capabilities. I don’t think that we will fight as 
services in the future; we will fight as a joint or combined force from now on. 
13. Can IO be conducted in such a way that it becomes effective to a non-
information age nation or theater? How can we succeed over an enemy who does not 
have IO instruments but has only conventional warfare equipment and mindset? 
This is a very good point. I think in reality if you want to prevail in the 
information age you need to have an information age structure. A good example is 
Afghanistan; it was not a part of the information age. The reality is we couldn’t fight an 
information age fight over there, which is why we had to go there toe-to-toe and defeat 
them on the ground, by supporting the Northern Alliance. The idea that we are going to 
win a war by IO itself is as unreachable as the idea that we are going to win a war with 
air power alone. If you are going to win a war, you have to have forces on the ground; 
you can’t just do it electronically or using computers viruses or PSYOP.  
How you fight with a stone age country is you shut down whatever they have 
first, you drop leaflets on them and you use conventional operations to support those 
leaflets as in the aforementioned example. But for sure you will have limited methods at 
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your disposal and you must be aware of this. You have to be strong in other aspects of the 
military as well; you cannot just build an ‘IO military’ and win wars. 
14. Do you think the popularity of IO will diminish like some other 
applications in time? 
You want to learn if it is real or shadow? As an answer I would say that 
information is becoming more and more important every day and it is a continuous 
evolution. Because of that, IO is here to stay, until that becomes not the ground truth. In 
other words, when information is no longer important to us for some reason, then IO will 
no longer be important to us. But I personally can’t conceive that this is going to happen. 
I can’t predict the future of course, but I can say that IO will stay as long as importance of 
information stays. Perhaps we might organize, emphasize it differently, or something else 
can be as important as IO as well. In the future IO can become so inherent in our actions 
that we are not going to think about it as much as now but implement it as second nature. 
One example might be aircraft; they are now so inherent in military operations that we 
take their use in combat as a given. 
15. What are your comments about the future of IO? 
The future if IO is linked to the future of information. As long as we are an 
information-focused society, then IO is going to continue to exist. It is extremely 
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